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THIS article examines the effect of airline deregulation
on the airline industry, its customers, and on the
United States air transportation system. Specifically it
compares the actual experience of the last decade against
the promises that were made by those who successfully
promoted the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.'
After a decade of airline deregulation:
(1) concentration of national and regional market
power is greater;
(2) routes are more circuitous;
(3) service is poorer;
(4) labor-management relations have deteriorated;
and,
(5) air travel is less safe.
Contrary to widespread assertions, lower ticket fares
have not accompanied these adverse effects. Adjusting
for the impact of changes in inflation and fuel prices -
which would have occurred with or without deregulation
1 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 102, 92 Stat. 1705
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1982)).
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- ticket prices today are at least 2.6 percent higher than
they were before deregulation.
If ticket prices could be adjusted for the loss of conven-
ience and productivity resulting from increased route cir-
cuity, there would be an even greater disparity between
pre and post deregulation pricing trends.
After an initial burst of competition and price cutting, a
new pattern of monopolistic and oligopolistic market
power, based on regional fortress hubs, emerged, erect-
ing significant barriers to new entrants into the market.
Thus, the comparatively vigorous price competition that
characterized the industry during the years immediately
following deregulation is unlikely to return. The regu-
lated oligopoly which existed under regulation has been
replaced with an unregulated oligopoly, with inevitable
adverse effects on consumers.
Deregulation advanced neither economic nor equity
goals. The assumptions upon which deregulation was
based - that few scale economies existed in the field, of
aviation; that destructive competition in the industry was
unlikely; that "contestability" of markets (the ease of po-
tential entry) would discipline pricing - have proven
false.
The time has come to reconsider the experiment of air-
line deregulation. Airline transport is too critical to the
economy and the well-being of the general public to be
abandoned for private concentrations of market power.
This article sets forth a legislative agenda for reform
which attempts to steer a common sense course between
heavy-handed regulation and laissez-faire. The legislative
provisions include:
(1) the establishment of an independent Federal
Transportation Commission - immune from capture by
any single transport industry - which would regulate the
industry from a broader perspective than possible with
the old regulatory system;
(2) the prohibition of a single airline maintaining a
dominant position at more than a single airport;
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(3) price regulation directed at keeping fares within a
range which would prohibit price-gouging in thin markets
on the one hand, and predatory pricing to drive out new
competitors on the other; and,
(4) regulatory or legislative changes directed at elimi-
nating price discrimination, so that fare differences reflect
cost differences and not differential market power.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, deregulation has been more thor-
ough-going in transportation than in other traditionally
regulated sectors. Among the several modes of transport
(e.g., air, rail, water, bus and motor), airlines have been
subjected to more comprehensive deregulation than any
other. This comprehensive deregulation began with the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (1978 Act) 2 which abol-
ished the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the federal reg-
ulatory agency controlling the industry during the
previous four decades.
Proponents of deregulation assumed that it would cre-
ate a healthy competitive environment, with many airlines
offering a wide array of price and service options and a
high level of safety. A decade or more of empirical evi-
dence indicates that present realities disprove these san-
guine expectations.
Before comparing the current state of affairs in the air-
line transport industry with the expectations of laissez-faire
economists, it is necessary to review the political, legal
and economic dimensions of airline regulation as well as
the origins and consequences of the deregulation move-
ment in the aviation industry. This article concludes that
deregulation has caused unprecedented levels of concen-
tration, discriminatory pricing, service deterioration and
narrower safety margins. By 1989, consumers were pay-
ing 2.6 percent more to fly per mile than they would have
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had the prederegulation downward trend in the per mile
charge for flying continued.
Yet, there are those who continue to defend airline de-
regulation despite its failures. One defender is Alfred
Kahn, the principal architect of airline deregulation. A
careful examination of his views may cause one to reject
them in favor of increased regulation in its proper form.
Finally, an analysis of the public interest in efficient and
affordable transportation will illustrate the need for a new
national transportation policy.
Since airline deregulation was the prototype for a dec-
ade of aggressive deregulation throughout the economy,
the failures of airline deregulation may have wide implica-
tions. It would be a mistake, for instance, to take the ex-
perience of the early years of airline deregulation - when
low, simply structured fares and dramatic competition
from new entrants seemed to justify the wildest claims of
its proponents - as a model of the benefits that deregula-
tion can bring. These short-term gains were followed by
medium and, arguably, long-term pain. If the airline ex-
perience can be generalized, the lesson would appear to
be: "caveat deregulation."
By the late 1980s, Kahn had become somewhat conciliatory about the
problems that had emerged under deregulation, though he insisted that the DOT
was largely to blame for these ills by, for example, approving every merger sub-
mitted to it, and not expanding airport capacity sufficiently. Nonetheless, Kahn
noted, "There have of course been severe problems and reasons for concern even
from the public's standpoint: most prominently sharply increased congestion and
delays, increased concentration at hubs, monopolistic exploitation of a minority of
consumers, and possibly a narrowing of the margin of safety .... " Kahn, Airline
Deregulation -A Mixed Bag, But a Clear Success Nevertheless, 16 TRANsP. L.J. 229, 251
(1988) [citation omitted] [hereinafter Kahn, A Mixed Bag]. To his credit, Kahn has
also become quite candid about his and his compatriots' failure to foresee the
"explosion of entry, massive restructuring of routes, price wars, labor-manage-
ment conflict, bankruptcies and consolidations and the generally dismal profit rec-
ord of the last ten years." Kahn, Surprises of Airline Deregulation, 78 AM. ECON. REv.
316 (1988) [hereinafter Kahn, Surprises]. This article explores Kahn's prederegu-
lation assumptions on contestability, concentration and predation, and contrasts
them with his confrontation with the empirical results of deregulation.
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II. ORIGINS OF AIRLINE REGULATION AND
DEREGULATION
The transportation industry has come full circle from its
genesis in an unrestrained laissez-faire economic environ-
ment to nearly a century of comprehensive governmental
regulation of entry and rates and other corporate activi-
ties, and finally back to an unrestrained market economy.
Market failure gave birth to economic regulation. In
the eyes of early advocates of regulation, transportation
was particularly prone to alternating periods of "destruc-
tive competition" and blatant monopoly or oligopoly. Be-
cause of the tremendous economies of scale along many
different dimensions exhibited by much of the transport
sector, the out-of-pocket or marginal cost of providing
service tends to lie far below its full or average cost.4 Un-
restrained competition in these circumstances tends to
drive the price down towards marginal cost, causing prof-
its to disappear. Bankruptcies and mergers ensue as ex-
cess capacity is weeded out, and profitable monopoly or
oligopoly inexorably emerges.
The restoration of market power may well be accom-
plished by a blatantly discriminating rate structure with
price differences between different markets reflecting not
relative costs, but the differing degree of competition.
For example, - price structure that fills planes by segre-
gating markets so that only the marginal customer pays a
low fare while others pay fares far above cost, forestalls
the losses associated with marginal cost pricing. This bla-
tantly discriminatory price structure, however, injures the
consumer. The segregation of business and pleasure
markets, which deregulation has taken to new heights,
would come as no surprise to early advocates of regulated
transportation.
The consumer, under the circumstances, sees things go
from bad to worse. Unstable packs of anemic, bankrupt
4 For example, given that a plane is flying between two cities with empty seats,
the cost of filling one more seat is virtually nothing.
AIRLINE DEREGULATION
carriers become sleek, powerful price-discriminating mo-
nopolies or oligopolies. In the view of early advocates of
regulation, these two phenomena, destructive competi-
tion and powerful monopolies, were simply two sides of
the same coin. The purpose of regulation, under these
circumstances, was to eliminate this Hobson's choice for
consumers: preventing the potential threats to safety, ser-
vice, and investment posed by destructive competition on
the one hand, and the price-gouging and price discrimina-
tion associated with market power in a consolidated in-
dustry, on the other.
Price discrimination and destructive competition in the
railroad industry prompted Congress to establish, in
1887, the first independent regulatory agency, the Inter-
state Commerce Commission.' During the Great Depres-
sion, Congress concluded that the economic condition of
the airline industry was highly unstable, and that a contin-
uation of its anemic condition could imperil its tremen-
dous potential to satisfy national needs for growth and
development.6 In order to avoid the deleterious impact of
what was variously termed "cutthroat," "wasteful," "de-
structive," "excessive," or "unrestrained" competition,
and to avoid the economic chaos which had so plagued
the rail and motor carrier industries, Congress sought to
establish a regulatory structure for airlines similar to that
which had been devised for these other "public utility"
type industries. 7 Thus, just three years after motor carri-
ers were brought under the regulatory umbrella, Con-
gress added airlines to the regulatory scheme,
promulgating the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.8 In so
doing, Congress created a new agency to regulate this in-
5 P. DEMPSEY & W. THOMS, LAW AND ECONOMIC REGULATION IN TRANSPORTA-
TION 7-11 (1986).
6 See, e.g., Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics Board-Opening Wide
the Floodgates of Entry, II TRANSP. L.j. 91, 95 (1979) [hereinafter Dempsey, The Rise
& Fall of the CAB].
7Id.
" Civil Aeronautics Act, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938) (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1542 (1988)).
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dustry: the CAB. 9
In the 1960s and early 1970s, economists published a
generous volume of literature critical of economic regula-
tion.' 0 Principal among their criticisms was that pricing
and entry restrictions gave consumers excessive service,
insufficient price competition, inflated airline costs, and
denied the industry adequate profits. Senator Edward
Kennedy chaired subcommittee hearings which served as
the political incubator of regulatory reform. The Ken-
nedy Report concluded that deregulation would allow
pricing flexibility which would stimulate new and innova-
tive offerings, allow passengers the range of price and ser-
vice options dictated by consumer demand, enhance
carrier productivity and efficiency, increase industry
health, and result in a superior allocation of society's
resources. " I
The movement in favor of reduced governmental pres-
ence found support on both ends of the political spec-
trum. America was infested by a mass psychology of
antagonism toward government, stimulated on the right
by the Great Society and the growth of government
spending and taxation, and on the left by Watergate and
the war in Vietnam. For once, both sides viewed govern-
ment as an enemy, rather than a friend.
With the inauguration of Jimmy Carter as President in
1976, the deregulation movement enjoyed strong White
House support. Carter appointed Cornell economics pro-
fessor Alfred Kahn, Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics
Board. Kahn criticized traditional CAB regulation as hav-
9 Id. The agency was initially named the Civil Aeronautics Authority.
- See Hardaway, Transportation Deregulation (1976-1984): Turning the Tide, 14
TRANSP. L.J. 101, 106 n.17 (1985) (listing articles in note 17); see also L. KEYS,
FEDERAL CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO AIR TRANSPORTATION (1951) (an early critic of
airline deregulation); R. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS: AN INDUS-
TRY STUDY (1962); W. JORDAN, AIRLINE DEREGULATION IN AMERICA: EFFECTS AND
IMPERFECTIONS (1970).
1 Oversight of Civil Aeronautics Board Practices and Procedures, Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Comm. on the Judiciaty, 94th Cong.
1st Sess. 3 (1975). See also Dempsey, The Rise & Fall of the CAB, supra note 6, at
118.
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ing "(a) caused air fares to be considerably higher than
they otherwise would be; (b) resulted in a serious misallo-
cation of resources; (c) encouraged carrier inefficiency;
(d) denied consumers the range of price/service options
they would prefer, and; (e) created a chronic tendency to-
ward excess capacity in the industry." 12
As CAB Chairman, Kahn implemented a number of ini-
tiatives which liberalized entry and pricing. In the late
1970s, the immediate results of these relatively modest
efforts at regulatory reform were quite positive. In the
late 1970s, carriers stimulated new demand by offering
low fares which filled capacity, and they consequently en-
joyed robust profits. This early success of airline deregu-
lation created a general euphoria in both Washington and
the media, bolstering support for its widespread
implementation.'l
Working with the White House, Kahn put his charis-
matic personality solidly behind the legislative effort for
reform. The predictions as to what deregulation would
bring were quite optimistic, despite strong misgivings by
12 P. DEMPSEY, LAW & FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 24 (1987)
[hereinafter DEMPSEY, LAW & FOREIGN POLICY]. See also, Kahn, The Theory and Ap-
plication of Regulation, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 177, 178 (1986) [hereinafter Kahn, Theory
and Application]; Kahn, Transportation Deregulation . .. and All That, ECON. DEV. Q
91, 92 (1987) [hereinafter Kahn, All That].
1- See, e.g., Dempsey, The International Rate and Route Revolution in North Atlantic
Passenger Transportation, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 393, 440-42 (1978). As a
young CAB attorney, this author was also swept up in the movement, praising the
benefits of partial deregulation:
The objective of [deregulation] has been to provide the consumer
... with improved services at reduced fares. In general, the theory
has been that increased competition among air carriers will lead to
improved quality and an increased variety of services available to the
public at competitive prices reasonably related thereto, and that the
price elasticity of the passenger market will ensure more efficient
utilization of capacity for the carriers and, consequently, increased
revenue. Enhanced reliance upon competitive market forces has
tended to lower air fares and stimulate innovative price/service op-
tions. It has also tended to fill empty seats and thereby increase car-
rier revenue. The policies appear to have had an affirmative impact
upon both consumers and the regulated industry that serves them.
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most of the industry.' 4 Kahn assured a skeptical public
that the benefits of deregulation would be universally
shared: "I am confident that . . .consumers will benefit,
that the communities throughout the country, large and
small, which depend upon air transportation will benefit,
[and] that the people most closely connected with the air-
lines as a whole, their employees, their stockholders, their
creditors, will benefit [as well].' 5
Congress responded by promulgating the Air Cargo
Deregulation Act of 1977 and the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978.16 Both Acts received overwhelming biparti-
san support. The 1978 Act was intended to provide a
gradual transition to deregulated entry and deregulated
rates, although the CAB quickly dropped any notion of
"gradual" deregulation under Kahn's successor, CAB
Chairman Marvin Cohen. What had begun as a program
of modest liberalization became an avalanche of abdica-
tion of responsible governmental oversight. Implementa-
tion of the new policy was immediate and comprehensive.
The Deregulation Act also called for the "sunset" of the
CAB in 1985, when its remaining responsibilities, includ-
ing oversight of mergers in the industry, were transferred
to an executive branch agency, the United States Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT).
III. CONSEQUENCES OF DEREGULATION FOR
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
A. Allocative Efficiency, Competition, and Contestability
Deregulation proponents believed that, freed from the
shackles of government, the airline industry would be-
come more competitive, providing the range of price and
' While most of the airline industry opposed deregulation, it was supported by
Federal Express and United Airlines (the largest airline in the free world).
vs To Amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to Improve Air Service and Provide Flexibil-
ity in Air Fares: Hearings on H.R. 11145 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House
Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1978) (statement of
Alfred E. Kahn, Chairman, CAB) [hereinafter 1978 House Hearings].
- For a general discussion of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, see P.
DEMPSEY & W. THOMS, supra note 5, at 28-29.
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service options dictated by consumer demand, tapping
the elasticities of demand with lower prices, filling capac-
ity, enhancing efficiency, and improving profitability.17
They also believed that neither safety nor small commu-
nity access would unduly suffer.' 8
Deregulation supporters felt it unlikely that destructive
competition, whose purported existence gave birth to reg-
ulation of this industry in the 1930s, would occur.' 9 But
the apparent consensus among economists concealed a
basic difference about what a "healthy competitive envi-
ronment" required. An old joke has the borrower of ajar
returning it broken and being asked to explain. He re-
sponds that he never borrowed it and, moreover, that it
was broken when he got it. There is a similar conflict be-
tween the two views regarding deregulation as a stimulus
for competition.
The 'traditionalist' view, whose adherents in the 1970s
included many of the incumbent regulators, held that
competitive pricing required a sizable number of competi-
tors. Based on some academic studies which failed to find
significant economies of scale2 0 in the production of air
17 In the short run and with relatively modest liberalization, they were right.
i" See generally, Hardaway, supra note 10.
to Study on Federal Regulation: Prepared Pursuant to S. Res. 71 to Authorize a Study of
the Purpose and Current Effectiveness of Certain Federal Agencies Before the Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 13-15 (1978). The Senate Committee
concluded: "Destructive Competitions" seems.., unlikely in the cases of airlines
and trucks." Id. Thus, the entire early theory of regulation is judged to have no
application to one of the very industries whose preregulation experience it was
designed to explain.
20 Economies of scale are realized when increases in total production simultane-
ously decrease unit costs. As the scale of production grows, the enterprise be-
comes more efficient. The classic example of the phenomenon of economies of
scale is the enormous cost savings experienced from producing automobiles on an
assembly line rather than one car at a time. The cost savings resulting from econ-
omies of scale can be attributed to: (1) indivisibilities-a large capital-intensive
piece of equipment operates most efficiently at full capacity; and, (2) division and
specialization of labor-highly specialized labor is more productive labor.
A concept related to economies of scale is economies of scope. Economies of
scope exist when a company can produce several different products more cheaply
than a specialized firm can develop each particular product separately. W.
BAUMOL, J. PANZAR & R. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF IN-
DUSTRY STRUCTURE 71 (1982). For example, it may be cheaper to produce pairs if
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transport, they argued that a deregulated industry would
have enough competitors to satisfy the traditional notion
of workable competition. In the absence of any cost ad-
vantages of big firms over small, there would be no mo-
tive to merge to achieve such non-existent economies.
This argument denied that the air transport industry was a
"natural monopoly" (or oligopoly) due to falling unit
costs. If costs do not fall over some dimensions, then the
view that the industry is prone to destructive competition
- the view which motivated early architects of airline reg-
ulation - is erroneous. Likewise, the tendency of prices
to approach marginal cost, where there is unrestrained
competition, does not suggest that smaller carriers will be
driven out of business. Decreasing unit costs allows com-
petitors to avoid losses. In short, because of the absence
of economies of scale, big airlines will not be able to wipe
out small airlines. Hence, the prolonged presence of a
sizeable number of competitors is likely and there is no
danger of monopoly.
A second argument for deregulation arises from the no-
items such as wheat and straw or beef and hide in one enterprise rather than in
specialized firms. Id. at 76. SeeJ. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956); R.
HEILBRONER & L. THUROW, ECONOMICS EXPLAINED (1982); and W. SHEPHERD, THE
ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1979).
A related concept is economies of density. By combining passengers and
groups of passengers, an airline can carry the aggregation of passengers more
cheaply than if it carried those passengers separately. Through careful scheduling
of flights, consolidating operations and routing passengers through its "hub", an
airline streamlines its system, making it more dense and thus more efficient. The
"hub and spoke" scheme employed by all of the major airlines is testimony to this
phenomenon. For example, an airline which carries 100 passengers in a single
plane to a destination as opposed to carrying 50 passengers in two aircraft to that
same destination is making use of economies of density. See A. FRIEDLAENDER &
R. SPADY, FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION REGULATION: EQUITY, EFFICIENCY, AND COM-
PETITION IN THE RAIL & TRUCKING INDUSTRIES 285-86 (1980); A. LAMOND, COMPE-
TITION IN THE GENERAL-FREIGHT MOTOR CARRIER INDUSTRY (1980).
As Melvin Brenner notes, the failure of researchers before deregulation to find
size advantages in air transport was partly a result of regulation itself, which kept
large firms from exercising their advantages vis-a-vis small firms. Hub and spok-
ing methods used to capture network economies were postderegulation phenom-
ena, when carriers were free to rationalize their route structures. And frequent
flier benefits-with the obvious advantages they offer to large carriers-were of
course postderegulation phenomena as well. See Brenner, Airline Deregulation - A
Case Study in Public Policy Failure 16 TRANSP. L. J. 179, 186-88 (1988).
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tion of "contestability.' '2 Some deregulation proponents
did not deny that air transport had significant economies
of scale, scope, density, or other natural monopoly char-
acteristics. Rather, they insisted that these characteristics
need not be a problem, because a natural monopolist
would be forced to price at cost by the threat of potential
entry. Thus, markets which were not competitive in the
traditional sense of having many competitors might yet be
"contestable" under certain conditions, conditions which
the airline industry allegedly fulfilled.
There are three key assumptions to the theory. First,
the potential entrant has access to the same technology as
the incumbent (there are no absolute cost advantages for
the incumbent). Second, entry into and exit from a partic-
ular market is costless - there are no "sunk" costs in-
volved. Third, consumers respond to a price reduction
on the entrants' part more quickly than incumbents can
respond with a matching price cut. If these assumptions
proved to be true, the mere threat of post-entry price-
matching by the incumbent would not suffice to deter
entry.
Unless prices always remain at cost, there would be an
incentive for costless entry to grab some of the monopoly
rent. The entrant would then enjoy a costless exit when
the incumbent matched the entrant's lower price. In the
airline example, the potential entrant could fly in his
"capital on wings," grab the rent that could be captured
by a slight undercutting of the incumbent, and then fly
out when the incumbent actually matches costs. The
move would avoid a price war and the associated losses
altogether. This possibility would then force the natural
monopolist to price at cost at all times.
Alfred Kahn's writing provides examples of both these
21 See W. BAUMOL, J. PANZAR & R. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THE-
ORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982); see also Bailey & Panzar, The Contestability of
Airline Markets During the Transition to Deregulation, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125
(1981).
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arguments, despite the logical tension between them.22
Because he was articulate and passionate about deregula-
tion, we turn to him for instances of each. First, an analy-
sis of traditionalism. A decade ago, Kahn dismissed fears
that the industry would become highly concentrated.
Large airlines, he argued, had no advantages over small
airlines.
In a 1978 House Subcommittee hearing, Congressman
Roman Harsha asked Kahn whether deregulation would
lead to destructive competition in which the large carriers
would drive out the smaller ones and eventually lead to a
monopolized market. 3 Kahn dismissed this fear on two
grounds. First, he argued that cut throat competition
would not occur because there are only a small number of
carriers who compete in one market after another. 24 Sec-
ond, Kahn pointed out that the stock value of the largest
carriers sold at thirty-three to thirty-seven percent of book
value. 25 To Kahn, this meant that investors did not be-
lieve that the big airline would swallow the little airline.26
Similarly, in 1977 hearings before the House Subcom-
mittee, Kahn said, "I do not honestly believe that the big
airlines are going to be able to wipe out the smaller air-
lines, if only because every study we have ever made
seems to show that there are not economies of scale." 27
True to his traditionalism, but contrary to his expecta-
Y2 That is, the tension between the fear of destructive competition driving
smaller carriers out of business and the need for such competition to keep new
entrants from joining the market. Restated, price wars are bad to the traditional-
ist because they drive the smaller carriers out of the market and thereby monopo-
lize the industry; contestability argues that price wars are necessary to discourage
new carriers from entering the market. The consumer benefits because of the
natural incentive to keep prices fair. In short, destructive price competition drives
the small carrier out of business while at the same time keeping new entrants out
of the market.
23 1978 House Hearings, supra note 15, at 178.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 178-79.
27 Aviation Regulatory Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House
Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1111 (1977) (herein-
after 1977 House Hearings).
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tions, Kahn is not unconcerned about the substantial con-
centration that exists in air transport today. Kahn now
admits that, in advocating deregulation, he misperceived
the advantages large firms have in the airline industry28
and underestimated the importance of economies of
scale and scope. 29 Kahn has conceded that the advocates
of deregulation were misled by the apparent lack of evi-
dence of economies of scale. s° In a 1988 Transportation
Law Journal article, Kahn admitted that fares are likely to
rise due to the disappearance of most of the price-cutting
new entrants and the marked reconcentration of the in-
dustry.3 ' Similarly, in testimony before the Senate Com-
merce Committee in 1987, Kahn said: "The industry has
become more concentrated at the national level because
of mergers and airline failures, and that means . . .that
price competition may well become less severe in the
years ahead."' 2 Transportation simply has not turned out
to be the ideal model of perfect competition that the tra-
ditionalist proponents of deregulation insisted it was.
There appear to be significant economies of scale, scope
and density, discussed in detail below.
For an example of the nontraditionalist view, which es-
pouses that airline transport, while naturally concen-
trated, nevertheless exhibits "contestability," we again
turn to Alfred Kahn. In the late 1970s, Kahn proclaimed
that almost all of the airline industry's markets could sup-
port only a single, or at most, a few, carriers. Their natu-
ral structure, he concluded, is monopolistic or
oligopolistic. Kahn asserted, however, that such a struc-
ture could nevertheless be conducive to highly effective
competition "if only the government would get out of the
28 Testimony of Alfred Kahn, California Public Utilities Commission 6247-48
(Jan. 31, 1989) [hereinafter Kahn Oral Testimony].
Id. at 6201.
so Kahn, Surprises, supra note 3, at 318.
31 Kahn, A Mixed Bag, supra note 3, at 236. See also Hamburger, Fares Rose With
NW 's Dominance, Minneapolis Star Tribune, Dec. 28, 1988, at 9-A.
32 Safety and Re-Regulation: Hearings Before the Senate Commerce Comm., 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 155 (1987).
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way; the ease of potential entry into those individual markets, and
the constant threat of its materializing, could well suffice to
prevent monopolistic exploitation.""
Entry, or more precisely the threat of potential entry,
would keep monopolists from extracting monopoly prof-
its. This was the essence of the contestability theory.34
Kahn advanced this theory on many occasions as Chair-
man of the Civil Aeronautics Board. Before another
House Committee in 1977, Kahn testified, "[w]ere it not
for Government restrictions, entry would be relatively
easy .... "" In a recent interview, Alfred Kahn noted,
"Certainly one of the assumptions behind airline deregu-
lation was that entry would be relatively easy."13 6
As with the traditionalist prediction of many competi-
tors and few size economies, the actual deregulation expe-
rience has seemed to mock the nontraditionalists'
scenario of "contestable" airlines markets as well. Kahn
is more honest than most deregulation proponents in
evaluating the theory of contestability, in the light of real-
ity. In testimony delivered in 1987 before a subcommit-
tee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Kahn, far less
enthusiastic about the possibility that contestability would
prevent monopolies in the airline industry, concluded that
while, yes, airline markets are relatively easy to enter, the
s Address by Alfred Kahn, New York Society of Security Analysts 24 (Feb. 2,
1978) [hereinafter Kahn Address] (emphasis supplied).
34 1977 House Hearings, supra note 27, at 1I11. Kahn testified that:
[A] realistic threat of entry by new and existing carriers on the initi-
ation of management alone is the essential element of competition.
It is only this threat that makes it possible to leave to management
a wider measure of discretion in pricing. It is the threat of entry that
will hold excessive price increases in check.
Id.
35 Economic Aspects of Federal Regulation in the Transportation Industry: Hearings Before
the Task Force on Tax Expenditures, Government Organization, and Regulation of the House
Comm. on the Budget, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1977) (testimony of Alfred Kahn,
Chairman, CAB).
'6 Interview with Alfred E. Kahn, ANrmrusT 1988, at 4, 6 [hereinafter Kahn
Interview]. According to Kahn, in deregulating the airlines "[wie emphasized the
contestability of airline markets and thought people would be well protected by
the possibility of entry, because airplanes can move. Well, I think we exaggerated
that... Surprises, But Few Regrets, 64 REASON 35-36 (1989).
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potential entry of competitors is no substitute for competi-
tors already there ....
Contestability is not a sufficient protection, in my opin-
ion, and anybody who looks at the airline industry cer-
tainly knows that the likelihood and opportunity of entry,
particularly by new carriers - low-cost, price-cutting car-
riers - has greatly diminished in recent years and is likely
to remain much looser than before. 7
Both the traditionalists and the nontraditionalists were
wrong. After a preliminary bout of classically destructive
competition, deregulation has produced a highly concen-
trated oligopoly. Such concentration followed a rash of
mergers and expansions directed at capturing scale econ-
omies, which the traditionalists denied existed. Further,
contrary to the nontraditional view, it is increasingly clear
that this oligopoly fails to act like a competitive firm be-
cause, while pricing at cost, it exploits its market power.
B. Industry Economic Anemia
Although destructive competition during the 1930s was
a major rationale for economic regulation in the airline
industry, deregulation's proponents insisted that deregu-
lation would not create destructive competition. In a
speech before the New York Society of Security Analysts
in 1978, Kahn characterized the opposition to airline de-
regulation as a general fear that "when the CAB with-
draws its protective hand from the doorknob, the door
will open to destructive competition - to wasteful entry
and cut-throat pricing - that will depress profits, render
the industry unable to raise capital, and so cause a deteri-
oration in the service it provides .... 1
Kahn saw the fear as unrealistic. Testifying before the
House Public Works Committee, he insisted, "I just do
37 Airline Deregulation 1987: Hearing on Airline Deregulation and the Effect It Has Had
on Airline Transportation in the United States Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies
and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 10
(1987) (statement of Alfred E. Kahn, Professor of Political Economy, Cornell Uni-
versity) [hereinafter Airline Deregulation 1987].
" Kahn Address, supra note 33.
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not see any reason to believe that an industry which is po-
tentially rapidly growing, for which there is an ever-grow-
ing market, cannot prosper and attract capital."' 39 Kahn
scoffed at deregulation's proponents who believed that
once the airline industry was deregulated, businessmen
would "rush into markets pell-mell, en masse, without re-
gard to the size of each, how many sellers it can sustain,
and how many others may be entering at the same
time. '"40 In fact, however, as a decade of empirical evi-
dence reveals, deregulation has brought about cut-throat
pricing, a miserable level of industry profitability, insuffi-
cient capital to re-equip its aging fleet, and a deterioration
of service.
Since deregulation began, the airline industry has suf-
fered the worst economic losses in its history.4 This pe-
riod of economic anemia began before the onset of the
early 1980 economic recession and ascending fuel prices,
and continued steadfastly after.42 While the bottom line
has recently improved as the industry has become so
highly concentrated, its average annual net profit margin
over the last eleven years has been a meager 0.7 percent,
compared with 4.5 percent for other U.S. industries.43
Ten years after he implemented airline deregulation as
President Carter's Chairman of the CAB, Alfred Kahn
wrote, "There is no denying that the profit record of the
39 Aviation Regulatory Reform: Hearings on H. R. 11146 Before the Subcomm. on Avia-
tion of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 133
(1978) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 11146].
40 Kahn Address, supra note 33.
41 Brenner, supra note 20, at 200-01. "The eight years [1979-86] of deregula-
tion comprise the worst financial period in airline history. The cumulative indus-
try operations in those eight years generated a loss of over $7 billion . Id. at
200.
42 See Dempsey, Transportation Deregulation-On A Collision Course?, 13 TRANsP.
LJ. 329, 342-52 (1984) [hereinafter Dempsey, Collision Course].
43 Ott, Industry Oficials Praise Deregulation, But Cite Flaws, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Oct. 31, 1988, at 88. In 1988, the industry's profit margin stood at 1.3 percent,
compared to two percent a decade earlier. Stockton, When Eight Carriers Call the
Shots, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1988, § 3, at 1, col. 3. Alfred Kahn maintains that the
airline industry's profit margin "fell to a puny 0.10 in the 1979-87 period." Kahn,
Surprises, supra note 3, at 316 n.1.
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industry since 1978 has been dismal, that deregulation
bears substantial responsibility, and that the proponents
of deregulation did not anticipate such financial distress
- either so intense or so long-continued.""
Deregulation was largely premised on the assumption
that there were no significant economies of scale or barri-
ers to entry in the airline industry. Its proponents argued
that new competitors would spring up to challenge the
entrenched incumbents, and the industry would become
hotly competitive. In the short run, more than 120 new
airlines appeared, although most were small, commuter
lines. 45 This flood of entry caused prices to spiral down-
ward. While a short term boon for consumers, the price
competition which emerged from deregulation was an un-
mitigated catastrophe for both the airline industry and, in
the long run, consumers as well. Nearly 200 airlines have
either gone bankrupt or been acquired in mergers since
deregulation. 46 Currently, only seventy-four carriers re-
main.47 Among the casualties are such darlings of dereg-
ulation as Air Florida, Freddie Laker's Skytrain, and
Donald Burr's People Express. Alfred Kahn once pointed
to these new upstart airlines as evidence that deregulation
was a brilliant success. They all have since dropped from
the skies. America West, and Midway remain, but they
have a relatively insignificant share of the domestic air
transport market.
The price wars, erosion of profitability, and industry
shakeout occurring in the wake of deregulation provide a
textbook illustration of the unique economic characteris-
tics that make transportation inherently vulnerable to
44 Kahn, A Mixed Bag supra note 3, at 248. Kahn recently said, "I found it dis-
tressing in the middle of this. I hated to be responsible for the industry suffering
so. I wanted to be sure that it would always be financially healthy and able to
attract capital." Kahn Oral Testimony, supra note 27, at 6247-48.
45 The Frenzied Skies, Bus. WK., Dec. 19, 1988, at 70, 72.
46 Pelline, Bumpy Ride Under Deregulation, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 28, 1988, at
21. One source estimates that 214 airlines have disappeared from the market.
Hamilton, Is the Airline Industry on the Verge of Going Global?, Wash. Post, Dec. 11,
1988, at K6, col. 1.
47 Pelline, supra note 46, at 21.
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price wars and excess capacity. Transportation firms sell
what is, in essence, an instantly perishable commodity.
Once an aircraft taxis down the runway, any unused ca-
pacity is lost forever. Empty seats cannot be warehoused
and sold another day. This inevitably leads to distress
sale pricing during weak demand periods or when excess
capacity created by unlimited entry exists.
The short term marginal cost of adding another passen-
ger to a scheduled flight is virtually nil - involving merely
printing another ticket, heating another meal, and adding
a few drops of fuel. Any ticket sold makes some contribu-
tion. Hence, strong incentives exist to sell empty seats for
whatever will lure a body to fill them.48 Carriers compet-
ing head to head spiral downward in destructive competi-
tion. In such circumstances, while carriers cover short-
term marginal costs, fixed costs are necessarily ignored.
These rather unique and brutal characteristics of air
transport led to distress sale pricing in the early 1980s fol-
lowing deregulation. To service this darkest financial pe-
riod in the history of domestic aviation, carriers had no
choice but to slash wages, trim service and maintenance,
and defer new aircraft purchases. Deregulators insist on
seeing air transport as just another industry. This insis-
tence, an almost willful ignorance on their part of the his-
torical experience of destructive competition in
transportation, has had grave but perfectly predictable
consequences.
Because airlines needed monopoly opportunities to
stem the economic brutality of destructive competition,
they merged and developed hub-and-spoke systems, giv-
ing them regional and city-pair market power. Firms fac-
ing extinction naturally seek out or create monopoly
market opportunities to afford them the market power to
raise prices. Thus, the large number of industry bank-
ruptcies and mergers, and the growth of national and re-
48 The difficulty airlines face is in managing yield in a way which lures passen-
gers not otherwise likely to fly; hence, Saturday stay-over requirements, which are
unappealing to business travelers.
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gional (hub) concentration, owe their existence to the
destructive competition unleashed by deregulation.
C. Concentation
1. National Concentration
The intense destructive competition resulting from de-
regulation has reduced the number of major competitors
at the national level, through waves of bankruptcies and
mergers, to the point that the airlines have become, in the
words of Alfred Kahn, an "uncomfortably tight
oligopoly." 49
Between 1979 and 1988 there were fifty-one airline
mergers and acquisitions. More than twenty of those
were approved by the DOT after 1985, when it assumed
jurisdiction over mergers. Of fifteen independent airlines
operating at the beginning of 1986, six had merged into
megacarriers by the end of 1987. The six largest airlines
increased their passenger share from 71.3 percent in
1978, to 79.2 percent in 1987.50 The eight largest airlines
accounted for eighty percent of the domestic market in
1978, and ninety-four percent in 1989. 5'
The DOT approved every airline merger submitted, af-
ter it assumed the CAB's jurisdiction over mergers, acqui-
sitions and consolidations.52 The 1978 Act insisted that
the agency guard against "unfair, deceptive, predatory, or
anticompetitive practices . . ." and avoid "unreasonable
industry concentration, excessive market domination..."
and similar occurrences which might enable "carriers un-
reasonably to increase prices, reduce services, or exclude
competition.... ."" Unfortunately these admonitions fell
49 Brenner, supra note 19, at 188.
5o Id. at 187. Brenner's 1987 market share figures differ slightly from those in
Chart IL, infra note 62 and accompanying text, which are based on mid-1987 data.
-5 Deregulation Focus, TRAFFIC WORLD (Dec. 5, 1988), at Supp. D, updated by
Happiness Is a Cheap Seat, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 4, 1989, at 68.
52 The DOT assumed the CAB's jurisdiction on December 31, 1984, pursuant
to § 408 of the Federal Aviation Act.
•53 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7) (1979); see Dempsey, The Rise & Fall of the CAB, supra
note 6, at 135.
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on deaf ears at the DOT, which never met a merger it did
not like.
For example, the DOT approved Texas Air's (i.e. Con-
tinental and New York Air) acquisition of both People Ex-
press (which included Frontier) and Eastern Airlines
(which included Braniff's Latin American routes); 54
United's acquisition of Pan Am's trans-Pacific routes;
American's acquisition of AirCal; Delta's acquisition of
Western; Northwest's acquisition of Republic (itself a
product of the mergers of North Central, Southern and
Hughes Airwest); TWA's acquisition of Ozark; and
USAir's acquisition of PSA and Piedmont.5 5 The major
mergers which have been consummated since deregula-
tion are depicted on the following chart:56
- DOT did require that some shuttle routes be sold off in the northeastern
corridor, but otherwise the Eastern acquisition by Texas Air passed through un-
molested. See Dempsey, Antitrust Law & Policy in Transportation: Monopoly I$ the
Name of the Game, 21 GA. L. REv. 505, 538 (1987) [hereinafter Dempsey, Monopoly].
5 To these mergers of passenger carriers, add the major air cargo acquisition
of Seaboard by Flying Tigers, the recent acquisition of Flying Tigers by Federal
Express, as well as the acquisition of Emery and Purolator by CF Air. Moreover,
concentration levels in the passenger industry are even more pronounced when
one recognizes that before deregulation, America had a healthy charter airline
industry that enjoyed significant market share. Under deregulation, it has nearly
vanished. See Brenner, supra note 19, at 185. In 1977, non-scheduled airlines had
43,397 domestic departures, compared with 18,577 in 1986. FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION, AIRPORT ACTIVITY STATISTICS OF CERTIFICATED ROUTE CARRIERS
5-8 (1977); FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, AIRPORT ACTIVITY STATISTICS OF
CERTIFICATED ROUTE CARRIERS 798-800 (1986).
- Bus. WK., Oct. 5, 1987, at 40; Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 1989, at A10; see also
Valente and Rose, Concern Heightens About the Airline Industry's March Toward Near
Domination by Only a Few Major Carriers, Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 1989, at A10.
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CHART I - MAJOR AIR CARRIER MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, PURCHASES AND




American ----------------------------- AMERICAN 16.6 15.2 13.8
Air C al -----------------------------------
United --------------------------------- UNITED 16.2 16.4 16.9
Pan Am (transpacific routes) -------
Texas International --------------------- TEXAS AIR 15.9 19.3 19.0
Continental ---------------------------






Braniff (Latin America) ------------
Rocky Mountain --------------------------------------
Delta ----------------------------------- DELTA 13.3 12.0 12.2
Western -------------------------------------
Northwest ---------------------------- NORTHWEST 9,6 8.9 10.3




TWA ------------------------------------- TWA 7.2 7.4 8.2
O zark ------------------------------------





Pan Am ------------------------------- PAM AM 5.9 7.1 6.3
National ------------------------------------
Ransome -------------------------------------
- Percentage market share as measured by revenue passenger miles. Sources: Busi-
ness Week, Oct. 5, 1987, at 40, and Wall Street Journal, Mar. 10, 1989, at A8.
Nor are these likely to be the last of the mergers. Carl
Icahn, owner of TWA, has announced that he would like
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to purchase another airline.5 7 Pan Am has been men-
tioned as ripe for acquisition or bankruptcy. To stay aloft,
Pan Am has already sold off its trans-Pacific routes and
aircraft, its Inter-Continental Hotel chain, and its Manhat-
tan skyscraper.
Eastern entered bankruptcy in early 1989. Even before
bankruptcy, Eastern was the incredible shrinking airline,
selling its east coast shuttle to Donald Trump, and its
computer reservations system and other valuable assets to
firms controlled by Frank Lorenzo's Texas Air.58
With the globalization of air transport, the potential
looms for the creation of international megacarriers. Al-
ready American, JAL and Quantas are trying to buy thirty-
five percent of Air New Zealand; British Airways has ac-
quired British Caledonian; SAS has purchased a ten per-
cent interest in Texas Air; Swissair and Singapore Airlines
each own five percent of Delta; Ansett of Australia holds
ten percent of America West; JAL owns twenty percent of
Hawaiian Airlines; KLM holds twenty-five percent of
Northwest; and several European airlines have bought
into United's Apollo/Covia computer reservations sys-
tem.5 9 Liberalization of air transportation in the Euro-
pean Economic Community scheduled for 1992 will likely
increase levels of concentration across the Atlantic, and
encourage more joint arrangements with United States
carriers (although cabotage laws prohibit more than
twenty-five percent foreign ownership of United States
flag airlines) .60 By the end of the century, there may be as
few as nine or ten global megacarriers.6 l United States
57 Valente, Icahn Wants To Purchase Another Airline, Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 1988, at
A4.
- The Boss They Love to Hate, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 20, 1989, at 20, 22.
59 Hamilton, supra note 46, at KI, K6; Dempsey, Corporate Pirates Assault the Heav-
ens-Leveraged Buy-Outs and the Airline Industry DEPAUL Bus. LJ. (1989).
- See DEMPSEY, LAw & FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 11, at 78-79; see also Demp-
sey, Aerial Dogfights Over Europe: The Liberalization of EEC Air Transport, 53J. AnR L. &
CoM. 615 (1988).
a, Stockton, supra note 43, at 3-6.
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megacarriers already dominate the global aviation
industry:
CHART II: WORLD'S Top TEN AIRLINES, 198762











As a result of this concentration within the industry,
many commuter airlines have disappeared because of
their inability to compete with the big airlines. The few
that remain are "captives" of the major carriers, serving
them at their hubs.63
2. Hub Concentration
Alfred Kahn blames the emergence of what he charac-
terizes as an "uncomfortably tight oligopoly 64 in domes-
62 THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 1989, at 63.
63 We are left with a situation aptly summarized by Morton Beyer:
The 11 major airlines have shrunk to eight; the eight former local
service carriers are now two and they are trying to merge; the eight
original low-cost charter airlines have been reduced to one, through
bankruptcy and abandonment; 14 former regional airlines have
shrunk to only four; over 100 new upstart airlines were certificated
by the CAB and about 32 got off the ground and most of those
crashed, leaving only a handful still operating; of the 50 top com-
muters in existence in 1978, 29 have disappeared ....
Today, the top 50 commuter carriers who constitute 90 percent of
that industry are captives of the major carriers, in part or in total
owned, controlled, and financed by the giant airlines and relegated
to serving the big airlines at their hubs.
The Effect of Airline Deregulation on the Rural Economy, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Rural Economy and Family Farming, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 61-62 (1987).
Kahn, Despite Waves of Airline Mergers, Deregulation Has Not Been a Failure, Den-
ver Post, Aug. 31, 1986, at 3G.
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tic air transportation on the DOT's permissive approach
to airline mergers: "They have been permitted by a totally,
and in my view indefensibly, complacent Department of
Transportation .... It is absurd to blame deregulation
for this abysmal dereliction. ' 65 Upon examination, how-
ever, of the deregulation-induced growth of 'fortress'
hubs, it becomes clear that mergers and acquisitions alone
cannot explain the growing concentration of the industry.
Even without mergers, the trend was to reconfigure
routes in such a way as to constitute a de facto parcelling
out of airports among ostensible competitors. Lax anti-
trust policy only aggravated this basic trend.
All but four hub airports are dominated by a single air-
line, controlling from sixty to sometimes eighty to ninety
percent of landings, takeoffs, gates, and passengers.66
Since deregulation, all major airlines have created hub-
and-spoke systems, funneling their arrivals and depar-
tures into and out of hub airports where they dominate
the arrivals, departures, and infrastructure.6 7 While entry
and exit regulation formerly constricted their geographic
operations, deregulation freed airlines to leave competi-
tive and smaller markets and consolidate their strength
into regional hubs and city-pair market monopolies and
oligopolies. The destructive competitive environment of
deregulation led them to seek out monopoly opportuni-
ties to stem the hemorrhaging of dollars. Ironically, a lax
antitrust policy may have saved the industry from a pleth-
ora of bankruptcies. As the dust settles from the initial
maelstrom of deregulation, the horizon appears devoid of
meaningful competition.
Clearly, the merger of Northwest and Republic resulted
in sharply increased levels of concentration at Minneapo-
lis/St. Paul and Detroit; the same happened at St. Louis
when DOT approved the merger of TWA with Ozark Air-
lines. But as Chart III reveals, massive hub concentration
Kahn, A Mixed Bag, supra note 3, at 234 (emphasis in original).
See Chart III, infra note 68 and accompanying text.
'' Dempsey, Fear of Flying Frequently, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 5, 1987, at 12.
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occurred at a large number of cities where no merger had
a significant impact.
CHART III: SINGLE CARRIER CONCENTRATION AT MAJOR







































Excessive levels of concentration also emerged in the
monopoly hubs of Charlotte (eighty-seven percent Pied-
mont), Chicago Midway (sixty-five percent Midway), Dal-
las Love (ninety-one percent Southwest), Dayton (sixty-
four percent Piedmont), Newark (sixty-five percent Texas
Air), and Raleigh (sixty-seven percent American), as well
as the duopoly hubs of Atlanta (ninety-five percent Delta
and Eastern), Chicago, (seventy-two percent American
and United), Dallas (eighty-seven percent American and
Delta), and Denver (eighty-nine percent Texas Air and
United) .69
Even Chicago O'Hare and Atlanta Hartsfield are in-
creasingly dominated by a single airline. In 1977, United
had twenty-nine percent of all boardings in Chicago; by
- CONSUMER REPORTS, June 1988, at 362-67.
'9 Brenner, supra note 19, at 190; see also Ott, Congress, Airlines Reassessing Deregu-
lation's Impact, Av. WE. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 9, 1987, at 163; Cushman, Jr., Two
Studies Conflict on Airline Fares, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1989, at A14; Hamilton, The
Hubbing of America: Good or Bad?, Wash. Post, Feb. 5, 1989, at HI, H2 col. 5 [here-
inafter Hamilton, Hubbing].
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1988, it had fifty-three percent.7 0 Even before the bank-
ruptcy of Eastern, Delta controlled sixty-two percent of
Atlanta.7 ' Since Frontier was absorbed, first by People
Express and then by Continental, no hub airport has en-
joyed the three-carrier competition which theretofore ex-
isted at Denver.72
Indeed, the explanation for significant levels of hub concentra-
tion at all but Detroit, Minneapolis/St. Paul and St. Louis is not
the DOT's generous approval of airline mergers, but simply the en-
try and exit opportunities unleashed by deregulation. Carriers
adopting particular cities as hubs increased frequencies
and leased more gates, while incumbent airlines quietly
exited in favor of market dominance opportunities of
their own in other hub airports. 73 Freedom to enter and
exit markets, the very heart of deregulation, is responsible
for concentration at more hub airports than is the DOT's
dereliction of its merger approval powers, abysmal
though it is.7 4 The CAB would certainly not have ap-
proved the widespread entry and abandonments which
produced this massive hub concentration.
A study prepared by Dr. Julius Maldutis confirms the
high levels of hub concentration resulting from deregula-
tion. Maldutis reviewed concentration levels at fifty of the
nation's busiest airports between 1977 and 1987, calculat-
ing the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for each.75
The United States Department of Justice utilizes the HHI
as its methodology for determining acceptable levels of
concentration for antitrust review. It provides a measure
based on squaring the market shares of individual firms,
and adding them together. For example, a firm with a 100
percent monopoly would have an HHI of 10,000. Under
70 The Frenzied Skies, supra note 45, at 72.
7 Hamilton, Hubbing, supra note 69, at H2, col. 5.
72 Dempsey, Monopoly, supra note 54, at 592-93.
75 See Stockton, supra note 43, § 3, at 1, col. 3.
74 Dempsey, Deregulation Has Spawned Abuses in Air Transport, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 21, 1988, at 147 [hereinafter Dempsey, Deregulation].
75 Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation on
Airlines, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 172 (1987) (statement ofJulius Maldutis).
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the Justice Department's analysis, an HHI below 1,000 is
unconcentrated; an HHI of between 1,000 and 1,800 is
moderately. concentrated. An HHI of above 1,800 is
highly concentrated. By 1987, forty of these fifty airports
had an HHI above 1,800; in other words eighty percent of
these airports were highly concentrated. Moreover,
Maldutis calculated the weighted average of concentration
for all fifty airports, finding that it rose from an HHI of
2,215 in 1977, to 3,513 in 1987.76 This corresponds to a
fall in the number of "effective ' 7 7 competitors in the aver-
age of the fifty airports from 4.51 in 1977 to 2.85 in 1987.
Hub concentration translates into escalating fares. As
noted in the New York Times: "Passengers who live in a hub
city and begin their flight there end up paying higher
fares, in some cases fifty percent more than they would
have had deregulation not occurred.17 8 The General Ac-
counting Office found that, after its merger with Ozark,
TWA increased fares thirteen to eighteen percent on for-
merly competitive routes radiating from St. Louis. 79 A
similar study compared fares in markets radiating from
Minneapolis-St. Paul in which Northwest and Republic
formerly competed, and found that rates rose between
eighteen and forty percent.8 "
In fifteen of the eighteen hubs in which a single carrier
controls more than fifty percent of the market, passengers
pay significantly more than the industry norm.8 ' A recent
study by the DOT of nine hub airports concluded that
fares at all but two increased faster between 1985 and
1988 than the 11.1 percent increase in the airline compo-
nent of the Consumer Price Index:
?6 Id.
,7 This is the number of equal-size competitors that would produce the same
Herfindahl index as is observed in a market. It is the reciprocal of the Herfindahl
in proportionate form.
7a Stockton, supra note 43, § 3, at 1, col.3.
7t GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIRLINE COMPETITION: FARE AND SERVICE
CHANGES AT ST. Louis SINCE THE TWA-OZARK MERGER 2, 3 (1988).
o Hamburger, Fares Rose With NWA's Dominance, Minneapolis Star Tribune, Dec.
1988, at IA.
81 Hamilton, Hubbing, supra note 69, at H2, col. 1.
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CHART IV: AIRLINE HUB MARKET SHARES AND PRICE
INCREASES BETWEEN 1985 AND 198882
Hub Airport Dominant Carrier Fare Increases
Atlanta Delta (62%) 5%
Charlotte Piedmont (89%) 34%
Cincinnati Delta (81%) 25%
Detroit Northwest (62%) 27%
Minneapolis Northwest (77%) 21%
Pittsburgh USAir (80%) -6%
Raleigh American (67%) 35%
St. Louis TWA (83%) 22%
Salt Lake City Delta (77%) 26%
The General Accounting Office, in a study comparing
1988 fares at fifteen concentrated13 hub airports with
fares at thirty-eight unconcentrated airports, reported av-
erage fares twenty-seven percent higher at the hubs.8 4
The higher fares at concentrated airports do not reflect a
premium for nonstop service, since the average number
of coupons per traveler at concentrated airports was
nearly equivalent to that of the comparison, unconcen-
trated airports (2.26 v. 2.28 coupons). The difference
persisted when average trip length was controlled, by ex-
cluding from the comparison group those airports where
average trip length was significantly longer than for con-
centrated airports. The study concludes that neither a
higher proportion of non stops nor a higher proportion of
short-haul (and hence more costly) flights can explain the
fare premium at concentrated airports. The study deter-
mined both that the increase in fares from 1985-1988 was
generally greater at concentrated airports, and that the in-
crease in fares was especially dramatic when a carrier es-
tablished dominance during the period.8 5 Finally, the
study found that in thirteen of fifteen of the concentrated
82 Id. at H2, col. 5.
83 Concentrated airports were defined as those where one airline handled at
least 60 percent of enplanements.
94 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIR FARES AND SERVICE AT CONCENTRATED
AIRPORTS (1989).
85 This further confirmed the effect of concentration on fares, which had been
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airports, the dominant carrier had higher fares, in some
cases much higher than other carriers' fares at the same
airport.
A recent study by Severin Borenstein8 6 finds that the re-
lationship between airport dominance and the level of
fares stands up to sophisticated econometric analysis
which controls for cost and quality effects on fares. His
estimates conclude that "a 10 percent increase in the av-
erage endpoint enplanement share for an itinerary would
lead to a 4.3 percent increase in average fare." '8 7
3. City-Pair Concentration
Many defenders of deregulation dismiss the concerns of
critics about the unprecedented levels of national concen-
tration permitted in the airline industry since deregula-
tion on the grounds that the relevant markets are not
national, but "city-pair" markets - the market for air
transport between a particular pair of cities. Thus a Con-
gressional Budget Office (CBO) study of airline deregula-
tion" contends that:
While there has been a substantial increase in industry
concentration since 1983, there has not been a corre-
sponding increase in concentration at the market level....
The effective number of carriers serving [city-pair] mar-
kets of more than 200 miles with 25 or more passengers
per day has grown from 2.4 carriers in 1983 to 2.5 carriers
in 1987.89
The CBO does not provide data on the earlier period
(1978-1983), but characterizes the evidence as indicating
a significant increase in competition over the period as a
documented in GAO's earlier study of airfares at St. Louis following the TWA.
Ozark merger.
" INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC POLICY STUDIES, U. OF MICHIGAN, HUBS AND HIGH
FARES: AIRPORT DOMINANCE AND MARKET POWER IN THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY
(1988) [hereinafter HUBS AND HIGH FARES].
87 Id. at 23.
88 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, POLICIES FOR THE DEREGULATED AIRLINE IN-
DUSTRY (1988).
- Id. at 15-16.
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whole. Since the latter part of the period saw an increase
of a scant one-tenth of a competitor, a "significant" in-
crease would have to have come in 1978-1983, prior to
the post-1983 consolidation of the industry. Later, in its
report, the CBO claims (without citation) that upon pas-
sage of the Airline Deregulation Act, "the average city-
pair with non-stop flights was served by 1.4 carriers." Us-
ing this figure, it is clear that for all practical purposes,
new entry had all but ceased by 1983. The "significant"
increase in competition amounts to a change from an ef-
fective, but regulated, monopoly (1.4 competitors), to an
unregulated duopoly in the average city-pair market.
Given the doubts which have arisen on the score of the
"contestability" of airline markets, and the ineffectual
threat of potential entry designed to discipline incumbent
carriers, it is difficult to take a great deal of solace in the
"increased competition" in the average market for which
deregulation is, by this measure, responsible.
Furthermore, problems exist with market definition.
The figures presented above, and those used by most pro-
ponents of deregulation, pertain to the provision of sin-
gle-carrier service between two cities, either nonstop or
indirectly through connections over the carrier's hub. De-
pending upon the chosen perspective, this focus may be
too narrow, or too broad.
From the vantage point that nonstop service has unique
attractions making it a separate market when compared
with connecting service, the direction of change in con-
centration in this narrower market is reversed. The effec-
tive number of carriers providing nonstop service fell in
the period from 1983 to 1987 (the period for which the
CBO study gives data) for the average city-pair market.90
On the other hand, a broader definition of the market for
air transport between two cities would need to include not
only single-carrier connecting service but also interlining
possibilities. These possibilities have been drastically re-
go Id. at 16.
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duced in the deregulation period due to the rise of hub
and spoking and the tendency toward hub dominance.9
An arbitrary market definition which includes single-carrier
connecting flights but excludes interline connections, biases
the resulting picture of changes in concentration by show-
ing more competition.
Like the CBO, Alfred Kahn insists that the airline indus-
try is more competitive post deregulation because there
are now fewer monopoly city-pair markets. This is pur-
portedly true despite the increase in industry concentra-
tion.92 Chart 5 supports this claim:
CHART V: NUMBER OF CITY-PAIRED MARKETS RECEIVING
SERVICE BY ONE OR MORE SCHEDULED
CARRIERS
93
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The same caveats, however, made with regard to CBO's
argument, also apply here. While it is true that the overall
number of monopoly markets has fallen since deregula-
tion, under regulation, a monopolist cannot extract mo-
nopoly rents from buyers because its rates are required by
91 Kahn, A Mixed Bag, supra note 3, at 233 n.7 (Kahn recognizes the bias in the
figures he presents towards overstating the increase in competition post-1978 due
to their exclusion of interlining).
' Kahn, Surprises, supra note 3, at 319.
93 Department of Transportation, Analysis of Official Airlin Guide Data, TRAFFIC
WORLD, Dec. 5, 1988, at Supp. B.
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law to be "just and reasonable." Neither telephone com-
panies nor electric utilities 'Can charge monopoly rates de-
spite their monopoly positions because their rate and
service levels are regulated by governmental agencies. An
unregulated monopoly, however, can charge whatever
price the market will bear.
In 1978, the Civil Aeronautics Board limited single
firms, which dominated seventy-six percent of America's
city-pair markets, to charging "just and reasonable" rates
and to earning no more than a reasonable return on in-
vestment. In 1988, monopoly carriers in nearly two-
thirds of America's city-pair markets charged whatever the
market would sustain. While the 1978 Act was before
Congress, Kahn urged that "[n]o automatic upward [pric-
ing] freedom should be allowed in markets dominated by
a single carrier."' 94 Today, nearly two-thirds of our na-
tion's city-pairs are unregulated monopolies.
Like monopolies, duopolies are not hotbeds of compe-
tition. Two firms may implicitly agree to lethargic price
and service competition, enjoying, in effect, a "shared
monopoly." In 1978, ninety-three percent of America's
markets were regulated monopolies or duopolies. In 1988,
eighty-five percent of American's markets were unregulated
monopolies or duopolies. Statistically, these figures sug-
gest an improvement in pricing freedom. Today, how-
ever, no government agency protects the public against
monopoly pricing and the extraction of monopoly profits.
Thus, whether we look at national, airport, or city-pair
measures of concentration, empirical experience appears
to have refuted the traditionalist argument for deregula-
tion. Economies of size (scale, scope and density), the pu-
tative absence of which was at the heart of the
traditionalist case for deregulation, seem to be pervasive.
Former DOT Assistant Secretary Matthew Scocozza re-
cently confessed, "[t]o be very honest, in 1978 we envi-
sioned that there would be a hundred airlines flying to
Kahn, A Mixed Bag, supra note 3, at 232.
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every major hub."95
4. Contestability Mythology Debunked
For several reasons, it is unlikely that a new entrant will
emerge to rival the megacarriers. First, the infrastructure
of gates, terminal facilities, and landing slots has been
consumed. Sixty-eight percent of our airports have no
gates to lease to a new entrant.9 6 Even if a current tenant
would be willing to lease a gate to an upstart airline, the
incumbent could nevertheless exact monopoly rents for
its lease. For example, at Detroit, Northwest Airlines
charges sublessee Southwest Airlines eighteen times what
Northwest itself pays for the space. The decision of DOT
to allow carriers to buy and sell landing slots means that
the deeper-pocket carriers can purchase market share and
thereby enjoy market power to reap monopoly profits.9 7
Second, United and American, the largest airlines, own
the largest computer reservations systems (CRS), from
which ninety percent of tickets are sold.98 This accounts
for seventy-seven percent of passenger bookings. Such
vertical integration offers the incumbent airlines the po-
tential to enjoy various forms of system bias (including
screen bias, connecting point bias, and database bias).99
The General Accounting Office has concluded that the
airline-owned systems are so dominant that they stifle
competition in the industry.'00 An airline which owns a
CRS has a thirteen to eighteen percent greater likelihood
95 The Frenzied Skies, supra note 45, at 73.
9- See Hardaway, supra note 10, at 49.
97 Id.
98 United sold half of its Appollo/Covia system for $500 million in 1988 to US
Air and four foreign airlines. O'Brian, Delta, AMR's American Airlines Plan to Merge
Counter Reservations Systems, Wall St.J., Feb. 6, 1989, at B10, col. 3. TWA had pre-
viously sold half of its CRS to Northwest Orient. In addition, Eastern's system
had been transferred to a Texas Air subsidiary for a paltry $100 million. Castro,
Eastern Goes Bust, TIME, Mar. 20, 1989, at 52.
- Sanders, The Antitrust Implications of Computer Reservations Systems, 51 J. AIR L. &
COM. 157, 180-83 (1985).
- Hamburger, Fighting Back Begins as Costs Go Up, Up and Away, Minn. Star Trib-
une, Dec. 24, 1988, at 6A [hereinafter Hamburger, Fighting Back].
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of selling its tickets through its system. 0 '
Moreover, the advantage of being listed in the com-
puter as having an "on line" connection with one of the
major airlines has led forty-eight of the fifty small air -car-
riers to affiliate themselves with the megacarriers, renam-
ing their companies and repainting their aircraft in
megacarrier colors. 0 2 Ninety percent of the 31.7 million
passengers who flew aboard regional airlines in 1987 were
carried aboard code-sharing airlines.' 0 3 Sophisticated
computers give airlines the ability to adjust the number of
seats for which discounts are offered on an hourly basis,
depending on passenger demand. 0 4 As a result of such
computerization, the small carriers have become, in effect,
franchisees of the large carriers, and are therefore an un-
likely source of new competition. Small carriers are fur-
thermore declining in number. The regional airlines,
peaking at 246 in 1981, dwindled to 168 by 1987.105
Third, large airlines have more attractive frequent flyer
programs. These programs serve to capture business
travelers, the most lucrative segment of the market. Once
business travelers are committed to a carrier's frequent
flyer program and have accumulated mileage, they often
prefer that carrier over its rivals, even when the rival of-
fers lower fares. This is especially true since most busi-
ness travel is paid for not by the individual flying, but by
his or her firm.
The loyalty created by frequent flyer programs insures
that a new airline will find it difficult to find a niche. Even
customers who have not previously accumulated frequent
flyer mileage with the incumbent will be less willing to ac-
cumulate future mileage with a new carrier offering full
travel to decidedly less exotic destinations. For example,
- Id. (Statistics were quoted by Michael Levine).
02 Renamed companies, for example, are United Express, Continental Express,
and American Eagle.
10.1 Dereg's Falling Stars, OAG FREQUENT FLYER, Aug. 1988, at 28.
-4 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIRLINE COMPETITION: IMPACT OF COMPUTER-
IZED RESERVATIONS SYSTEMS - (1986).
10. Dereg's Falling Stars, supra note 103.
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should a small local airline find a major airport with suffi-
cient capacity to establish a hub, could such an airline (Air
Omaha, for example) lure passengers away from its rivals'
frequent flyer programs and free trips to Hawaii, when it
could only offer a free weekend in Cedar Rapids?
Not only are the frequent flyer programs creating pas-
senger loyalty, but commission overrides t0 6 are generat-
ing loyalty among travel agents. 0 7 Thus, both passenger
and agents often prefer a more expensive, established air-
line to a discount carrier. Indeed, the travel agent has
been given an incentive to engage in fraud. For example,
suppose the consumer calls and asks whether there is a
flight on Carrier A at noon. There is, but the agent is
working toward commission overrides on Carrier B this
month. How easy it would be for the agent to say, "Sorry,
the noon flight is sold out. But I can get you a seat at 1:30
on Carrier B."
Fourth, although new entrants enjoyed significantly
lower labor costs in the inaugural years of deregulation,
the squeeze on carrier profits unleashed by deregulation
has forced management to exact severe concessions in
terms of labor wages and work rules. Some airlines, in-
cluding Continental, Eastern, and TWA, have effectively
crushed their unions. Others, including United, Ameri-
can, and Delta, have established two-tier pay scales, with
B-grade pay for newly hired employees. The margin of
labor cost and productivity between a new entrant and an
established airline has thus been significantly narrowed.
Fifth, incumbents have shown that they will not sit idly
by while new airlines rob them of their market shares.
When new entrants offer lower fares, the incumbents al-
most always match them. This destroys the new rival car-
rier for a number of reasons. For example, suppose a new
-Commission overrides are bonuses paid by a carrier to agents who generate
a predetermined target revenue level for the carrier.
107 See Rose, Travel Agents' Games Raise Ethics Issue, Wall St. J., Nov. 23, 1988, at
BI0, col.2. Domestic commission overrides range from one percent to five per-
cent above the standard nine percent to ten percent commission. International
bonuses can be several times the standard eight percent commission. Id.
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carrier such as Air Omaha calculates that if it offers a $49
fare between Omaha and Minneapolis, it will fill about
seventy percent of its seats, because the incumbent,
Northwest, does not offer a comparable fare. 08 Due to
lower labor costs and the use of leased, relatively old
equipment, Air Omaha's break-even load factor is a mod-
est fifty-five percent. 0 9 Air Omaha begins operations and
rolls in a healthy profit, right?
Wrong. Northwest will match the $49 fare, and Air
Omaha's load factors will drop well below its break-even
load factor. Northwest can not only withstand the loss
generated by the lower fare because of its deeper pocket,
but the discount fare will actually cost it little, since it will
only be offered to passengers traveling between the two
points. Northwest has a major hub in Minneapolis, and
most of its passengers travel to or from points beyond -
in industry jargon, they constitute "beyond-segment
feed." As such, they are not offered the bargain fare.
Thus, only a portion of Northwest's passengers enjoy the
discount. Moreover, many of the business travelers in the
city-pair market will be willing to pay more than $49 be-
cause they have accumulated mileage in Northwest's fre-
quent flyer program. Air Omaha must eventually exit this
particular market because ordinarily only a carrier with a
hub at the flights destination can successfully challenge a
rival at the rival's hub.
Finally, more than 150 airlines have failed since 1978.
Many of these have been pushed into bankruptcy by the
predatory behavior of their larger rivals. As a result, in-
vestor confidence in new airline ventures has largely evap-
orated." O Hence, significant new entry is highly unlikely
108 In this example, Air Omaha's load factor of 70% would be above industry
average which in 1984 and 1988 ranged between 59% and 62%. AMR CORPORA-
TION, ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1989).
1'" In contrast, United's break even load factor between 1986 and 1988 ranged
between 62% and 64% . UNITED AIRLINES CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT 1
(1988).
11 See Russell, Flying Among the Merger Clouds, TIME, Sept. 29, 1986, at 56-57.
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in the deregulated airline industry."' Incumbent carriers'
dominance of gates, terminal space, landing and takeoff
slots, computer reservations systems, and the most attrac-
tive frequent flyer programs make it unlikely that new en-
trants will emerge to challenge the megacarriers. In fact,
no major carrier has emerged since 1985.' 12
More and more observers are concluding that the
postderegulation airline industry is not "contestable" in
the market theory sense' 13 because entry barriers are per-
vasive, especially in hub airports. As one commentator
noted:
[e]ntry into the industry by new carriers seems remote,
and entry onto new routes is far more difficult than many
envisioned it would be with deregulation. Many airline
observers thought that the 1978 deregulation of pricing
and entry would make airline markets "contestable." That
is, airlines could engage in "hit-and-run" entry into each
other's markets in response to profit opportunities - sim-
ply by shifting a plane from one route to another. Instead
the evidence compiled in the USAir-Piedmont record, as
well as a large body of solid research by economic and
legal scholars in the past three years, demonstrates that
incumbent airlines are frequently able to charge higher
prices on routes where other carriers face barriers to
entry." 14
Deregulation's nontraditionalist proponents, just as tra-
ditionalists and scale economy adherents, overestimated
the competitive nature of the industry. As Charles Rule,
Assistant Attorney General directing the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice, recently observed,
"[M]ost airline markets do not appear to be contestable, if
they ever were .... [D]ifficulties of entry, particularly on
city pairs involving hub cities, mean that hit-and-run entry
1 See Dempsey, Monopoly, supra note 54, at 590.
.,2 Hamburger, supra note 80, at 9A.
". See generally Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theoy, Firm Strat-
egy, and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393 (1987).
14 Guerin-Calvert, Hubs Can Hurt on Shorter Flights, at Crowded Airports, Wall St.
J., Oct. 7, 1987, at 34, col. 4.
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is a theory that does not comport with current reality."' 5
Even Kahn acknowledged that, while easy entry was one
of the major assumptions behind airline deregulation,
"we never thought that [legally free entry] would provide
adequate protection in markets that are naturally monop-
olistic or oligopolistic - that just won't support more
than one or two carriers."' 16 Kahn further admitted that
ideologues had irresponsibly justified airline deregulation
by emphasizing the concept of "contestability," despite
clear evidence of a paucity of new entrants. 1 7
But even if new entry is unlikely, the underlying issue
remains: Is the high level of concentration which has
emerged in the airline industry under deregulation a
cause for concern? After all, even though Coke and Pepsi
dominate the soft drink industry, we still have price com-
petition between them. Although many other American
industries are dominated by huge firms, transportation is
unique in the way it impacts the economy. As Melvin
Brenner put it:
Other industries, even when comprised of only a few large
firms, do not usually end up with a one-supplier monopoly
in specific local markets. But this can happen in air
transportation.
Moreover, because of the nature of transportation, a lo-
cal monopoly can do greater harm to a community than
could a local monopoly in some other industry. This is
11.1 Rule, Antitrust and Airline Mergers: A New Era, 57 TRANSP. PRAC. J. 62, 68
(1989) (speech before the International Aviation Club, Washington, D.C., March
7, 1989). OnJanuary 1, 1989, theJustice Department took over the largely latent
airline merger authority of DOT. Id. at 62 n.5. Mr. Rule's recognition of market
reality appears to be a breath of fresh air over his DOT counterpart's blind faith in
market theory.
116 Kahn Interview, supra note 35, at 7.
,17 Id. Kahn conceded:
that the idealogue [sic] began simplistically to parrot the word "con-
testability" as though it were a substitute for looking at the realities,
even if the realities were manifestly changing, even if survival of the
new entrants was becoming more and more questionable, as more
and more of them were going out of business, and even as it became




because transportation is a basic part of the economic/so-
cial/cultural infrastructure, which affects the efficiency of
all other business activities in a community and the quality
of life of its residents. The ability of a city to retain ex-
isting industries, and attract new ones, is uniquely depen-
dent upon the adequacy, convenience, and reasonable
pricing of its airline service.' 18
IV. PRICING
Kahn once argued that deregulation would bring about
cost-based pricing. After a decade of deregulation, how-
ever, prices seem to reflect the level of competition in a
particular market, not costs. As demonstrated in the pre-
ceding section, there appears to be a negative correlation
between the level of competition and price, with markets
having fewer competitors exhibiting higher prices."9
Admittedly, competition has enabled some users (par-
ticularly passengers with flexible schedules in major air-
line markets) to enjoy lower prices. Low fares have
stimulated new traffic in the past decade, mostly for vaca-
tion travelers flying between large cities served by more
than a single carrier. °2 0  But individuals flying to small
" Brenner, supra note 19, at 189.
"' See E. BAILEY, D. GRAHAM & D. KAPLAN, DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES (1985);
Call & Keeler, Airline Deregulation, Fares, and Market Behavior: Some Empirical Evi-
dence, in ANALYTICAL STUDIES IN TRANSPORT ECONOMICS 221 (A. Daugherty ed.
1985); Graham, Kaplan & Sibley, Efficiency and Competition in the Airline Industry, 14
BELL J. ECON. 118 (1983); Moore, U.S. Airline Deregulation: Its Effect on Passengers,
Capital, and Labor, 29J. L. & ECON. I (1986); Morrison & Winston, Empirical Impli-
cations and Tests of the Contestability Hypothesis, 30J. L. & ECON. 53 (1987).
120 According to the industry, in 1977, the airlines carried 240 million passen-
gers; in 1987, they carried 447 million passengers. These figures, however, may
exaggerate the public enthusiasm for flying under deregulation. First, the figures
themselves may distort the number of passengers flying by counting ticket cou-
pons. Postderegulation hub and spoking often creates two coupons, whereas
prederegulation nonstops produced one. Second, the graying of America has
moved a larger block of America's population into the more affluent 35-65 age
group, which has always flown more. Third, the fare wars of the early 1980s stim-
ulated new traffic, building air transport into the lifestyles of Americans, and ad-
dicting them to it. Many continue to fly although prices have increased. Finally,
the price wars of the early 1980s destroyed the intercity bus industry, leading to
the merger of Greyhound and Trailways and the cancellation of several thousand
small towns from bus networks.
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towns and last minute travelers, such as business persons
and people needing immediate flights home for funerals
or other emergencies, are ineligible for these discounts.' 2'
Deregulation inevitably eradicates some of the important
benefits derived from the traditional scheme of economic
regulation, including the prohibition against price
discrimination. 22
Moreover, the unprecedented concentration resulting
from massive bankruptcies and mergers threatens to
make the low prices enjoyed in large, competitive markets
a short-term phenomenon. In fact, as shown below, the
aggregate benefits from fare reductions may very well
have reached zero in 1988. Holding fuel prices constant,
the real yield or revenue per passenger mile (a commonly
used measure of average fares) paid in 1988 matched
what a projection of the prederegulation (downward)
trend would have given for that same year. This reflects a
one-time drop in yield immediately following deregula-
tion coupled with a slower rate of decline of fuel-adjusted
real revenues per passenger mile after deregulation than
before. The steep rate of decline projected from the
prederegulation downward trend in fuel-adjusted fares
"caught up" with the real yield in 1988, despite increases
of approximately thirteen percent in real terms immedi-
ately following deregulation. The gains from deregula-
tion have proven short-lived; indeed, they are already a
thing of the past. A preliminary estimate for 1989 in-
dicates that consumers are paying 2.6 percent more in
airfares than prederegulation downward trend
projections.
Public opinion polls reflect growing consumer irritation
with the deregulated airline industry. In 1984, when con-
sumers were asked, "Should airlines be allowed to raise or
121 Ott, supra note 43, at 89.
122 See Wagner & Dean, A Prospective View Toward Deregulation of Motor Common
Carrier Entry, 48 ICC PRAc. J. 406, 413 (198 1); see also, Wagner, Exit of Entry Controls




lower their fares on their own, or should they be required
to get government permission?," only thirty-five percent
believed that airlines should be required to get the gov-
ernment's permission. As consumers became more ac-
quainted with deregulation, however, they became less
enamored with it. In 1987, when asked the same ques-
tion, almost half were willing to opt for increased govern-
ment rate regulation.12 3 Even Kahn has admitted that it
may be time to consider price ceilings in markets domi-
nated by a single carrier.12 4
A. Cross-Subsidization and Price Discrimination
Prior to deregulation, cross-subsidization existed to
some extent within the air transportation industry. While
carriers were allowed to serve specified lucrative routes,
they were also required to serve less lucrative markets in
the geographic territory designated by their operating
certificates. Carriers were expected to cross-subsidize
losses or meager profits earned from serving small com-
munities with healthier revenues earned from dense, lu-
crative markets, and provide just and reasonable rates to
both. Deregulation was designed to end this internal
cross-subsidization on grounds that such wealth redistri-
bution created allocative inefficiency.
Under deregulation, cross-subsidization appears merely
to have been reversed in direction, rather than eliminated.
Carriers now impose higher rates in their monopoly and
oligopoly markets to cross-subsidize the losses incurred as
a result of the intense competitive battles being waged for
market share in dense traffic lanes. 25 For example, re-
'2 McGinley, Bad Air Service Prompts Call for Changes, Wall St.J., Nov. 9, 1987, at
29, col. 5-6.
1'2 Ex-Official Suggests Lid on Air Fares, Rocky Mtn. News, Nov. 5, 1987, at 100.
Said Kahn, "I don't reject the idea as a matter of principle. If price gouging gets
bad enough, consumers will demand and deserve protection." Hamburger, Fight-
ing Back Begins as Costs Go Up, Up and Away, Minneapolis Star Tribune, Dec. 24,
1988, at 6A. See also, Kahn, Surprises, supra note 3, at 320; Carroll, Higher Fares,
Better Service Are Forecast, USA Today, Oct. 24, 1988, at BI.
".1 Brenner, Are Airlines Off Course?, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1989, at A15, col.2
(E.ed.). As Melvin Brenner noted:
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cently the airline rate from Dubuque to Chicago was $1
per seat mile, while the fare from Los Angeles to New
York was 3.3 cents per seat mile. 126 In 1987, a round trip
coach ticket between International Falls, Minnesota, and
Minnneapolis/St. Paul was eighty-six cents per seat mile;
between Washington, D.C. and Minneapolis/St. Paul, the
fare was twenty-seven cents per seat mile. The trip from
St. Louis to Madison, Wisconsin, cost $225 one way, while
a ticket from New York to Los Angeles via St. Louis was
only $199.27 These fares take from those who fly to or
from small towns and give to those who fly from large
cities. In the short-term, passengers flying in dense, com-
petitive markets enjoy a windfall. The carriers which are
ultimately victorious in the price wars stand to reap signif-
icant economic rewards once the dust has settled and the
competition has been eliminated.
B. Price Savings
Many proponents of deregulation claim that deregula-
[D]eregulated airline pricing until now has reflected substantial dis-
tortion of normal market forces, resulting from what in foreign-trade
parlance would be called "dumping ......
Carriers are more likely to engage in dumping in the "other fel-
low's" market-i.e., any route where the price-cutting carrier has
had little participation. As prices are cut below full cost on the more
intensely competitive routes, carriers have found it necessary to
compensate for this by boosting prices above full cost on other
routes. Some passengers end up paying more than the cost of their
transportation, in order to subsidize the below-cost bargains en-
joyed by other passengers.
Id. at A13.
1211 The Effect of Airline Deregulation on the Rural Economy: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Rural Economy and Family Farming of the Sen. Comm. on Small Business, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 81 (1987) (testimony ofJohn J. Nance)[hereinafter Nance Testimony].
127 Dempsey, Fear of Flying Frequently, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 5, 1987, at 12. The com-
plete disconnection of relative price from relative costs is apparent from a com-
parison of Delta's flights from Oakland to Salt Lake City versus Oakland to
Phoenix. The latter flights stop in Salt Lake, Delta's hub, but cost much less than
the former. Obviously, the leg from Salt Lake to Phoenix cannot have negative
costs, even considering the lower unit costs of flying longer distances. The level
of competition in the Oakland to Phoenix market (comparatively high) versus
Oakland to Salt Lake (low) is the explanation. Unfortunately for Delta, they have
not figured out a way to stop Salt Lake City-bound travelers from buying tickets to
Phoenix and getting off in Salt Lake, throwing away the unused coupon.
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tion has been successful by pointing to the significant
price reductions enjoyed by consumers during the past
decade. Kahn, for example, claims that inflation-adjusted
fares have dropped thirty percent since 1976. Lesser sav-
ings are alleged by former DOT Secretary, James Burnley,
who claimed that, by 1988, inflation-adjusted fares had
dropped thirteen percent since deregulation. 128 Both es-
timates preceded the demise of Eastern, when fares began
to increase significantly, and Kahn employs a base year
two years prior to promulgation of the 1978 Act.
According to the Air Transport Association, real yields
(revenues per passenger mile) have fallen twenty-eight
percent since 1977, when Kahn took over at the CAB and
began to allow more flexible pricing by the airlines (see
Column 1 of Table 1 below). This appears to be an im-
pressive achievement indeed, until compared with the his-
torical record prior to deregulation and the behavior of
the price of jet fuel. This sobering comparison clearly
shows the emptiness of attributing the reduction in real
fares since 1977-78 to deregulation, as displayed in Table
1.
First, note that real yields fell in the period prior to de-
regulation as well. From 1967-1977 they fell at an annual
average rate of 1.7 percent per year, compared to the
post-deregulation (1978-1988) per year rate of decline of
2.4 percent. On the surface, it appears that deregulation
increased the rate of decline. Attributing, however, the
entire decline to deregulation ignores the pre-existing
downward trend. 129 In fact, air fares have been declining
at about the same rate for more than forty years - a long-
term trend preceding deregulation by several decades. 30
12 Airline Deregulation Under Fire, Denver Post, Sept. 23, 1988, at 4A. "Average
fares, adjusted for inflation, have declined 13 percent in the 10 years of free-mar-
ket travel." Id. Burnley, Soaring Air Travel in Unfettered Skies, Wash. Times, Oct. 31,
1988, at 4-D.
1,-, Melvin Brenner has made this point for eight years since deregulation.
Brenner, Rejoinder to Comments by Alfred Kahn, 16 TRANSP. L.J. 253, 254-55 (1988).
so Work, Morse, Gallagher & Gregg, Better Buys, Crowded Skies, U.S. NEWS AND
WORLD REP., Oct. 31, 1988, at 50-51.
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Even the more moderate claim, however, of an acceler-
ated rate of decline in prices after deregulation is ques-
tionable according to the figures in column 2 of Table 1.
Real yields (prices) fell in the ten year period prior to de-
regulation despite a doubling of the real cost of fuel,
while the somewhat higher rate of postderegulation de-
cline occurred contemporaneously with a twenty-five per-
cent decline in the real price of fuel. During the entire
period, fuel constituted anywhere from twelve percent of
costs, in the early 1960s, to thirty percent after the second
oil shock, and back down to fifteen to sixteen percent in
recent years.' 3' Thus, a percentage change of between
twelve and thirty percent (depending on the year) in real
fuel prices occurring during a given period is not a result
of the regulation or deregulation of the airline industry.
The third column of Table 1132 takes this into account by
omitting from the real yield series the changes that were
solely attributable to changing real fuel prices. 33 The re-
sult, exhibited in column 3, shows that holding fuel prices
constant, the real price of air travel fell more rapidly (an
annual average percentage decline of 2.7 percent) in the
period prior to deregulation than after deregulation (a de-
cline of 2.0 percent). Roughly, real yields would have
fallen one percentage point more a year (seventeen per-
cent of 5.9) had it not been for the average 5.9 percent
increase in real fuel prices during the period 1967-1977;
whereas real yields would have fallen .4 percent less per
year (about fourteen percent of 2.8) had it not been for a
gratuitous 2.8 percent annual decline in real fuel prices
during the 1978-1988 period.
The fuel-adjusted series shows what the average Ameri-
can senses about deregulation but what the unadjusted
data obscure - the enormous "front loading" of the
1- AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION, AIRLINE COST INDEX (1989).
1-1 Air Transport Association and author's calculations. See Appendix, infra.
1- Real fuel prices are calculated for a given year as the product of the fuel
share of all cash expenses in the previous year and the contemporaneous percent-
age change in real fuel costs-see the Appendix for details.
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gains of deregulation. From 1977 to 1978 and from 1978
to 1979, fuel-adjusted real yields fell ten and twelve per-
cent respectively. Not until 1988 did real yields fall an-
other ten percent - an annual average percentage
decline of only .9 percent. The unadjusted data obscure
this by making the first few years of deregulation, which
coincided with the second oil shock, look worse than they
were; while the latter part of the period, when real fuel
prices plummeted, looks much better than it actually was.
Note, too, that from 1985 to 1988, fuel-adjusted real fares
actually rose - the only three year period during twenty-
one years when this was so.
The apparent difference in the rate of decline of real
revenues per passenger mile before and after deregula-
tion was tested for statistical significance using regression
techniques.1 34 The unadjusted real yield series falls signifi-
cantly faster after deregulation than before (at a continu-
ously compounded annual rate of 3.1 percent from 1978
to 1988 compared with 1.5 percent from 1967 to 1977). 3
The fuel-adjusted series, on the other hand, falls at a sig-
nificantly faster rate before deregulation - at 2.7 percent
from 1967 to 1977 versus 1.9 percent from 1978 to
1988.136 Instead of falling twice as quickly after deregula-
tion, as the unadjusted numbers would suggest, real air-
line yields per passenger mile fell at a thirty percent
slower rate after deregulation. The regressions also sug-
gest that deregulation was responsible for a one-time re-
duction in fares on the order of thirteen percent, as
Figure 1137 shows. By 1988, however, due to the slower
rate of decline of real fares, all the gains of this one-time
shift had been dissipated. In other words, by 1988 con-
sumers were paying "net" prices (net of the effects of
1,4 See Appendix, infra for the detailed results.
,- The rates reported here differ from those in Table I because they are least-
squares growth rates, first, and because they are continuously compounded an-
nual growth rates, second.
I.- See Appendix, infra.
137 Air Transport Association and author's calculations.
118 Id.
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fuel) exactly equal to what they would have paid had
prederegulation trends continued. By comparison, Fig-
ure 2138 shows the prederegulation trend compared with
actual when only "gross" prices, unadjusted for fuel cost
changes, are examined. Again this is dramatically mis-
leading as an indicator of consumer gains, attributing to
deregulation what is really a result of lower oil prices.
The case for a gain to consumers from deregulation based
on the twenty-eight percent fall in unadjusted real yields
since 1977 is vacuous, to put it charitably.
The industry's use of revenue per passenger mile as a
measure of consumer prices also presents a significant
methodological distortion. Consumers, who in 1988 were
paying in real terms net of fuel exactly what they paid
prior to deregulation per passenger mile, were, overall
flying more miles to make the same trip after deregulation
than before. Thus, a decline in revenue per passenger
mile may represent only an increase in miles for making
the same trip, with no reduction - or even an increase -
in the price of the trip. Hub and spoking has significantly
increased circuity in air travel, thereby lengthening the
distance between origin and destination. Many (if not
most) passengers who do not begin or end their trip in a
hub airport have to fly more miles to get to their destina-
tion than they did before deregulation. Estimates of this
139 S. MORRISON & C. WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AIRLINE DEREGULA-
TION 22-23 (1986). Morrison and Winston give 5.4 percent as an estimate of in-
creased travel time post-deregulation, which they attribute partly to increased
circuity, partly to increased congestion. Id. The percentage increase in mileage
due to circuity may be very different, of course. Since so much of travel time is
takeoff and landing, increased mileage per trip will not add proportionately to
travel time. Hub and spoking, however, also increases takeoffs and landings per
trip, which goes in the other direction. Taking 5.4 percent as an estimate of in-
creased mileage amounts to treating these opposing factors- arbitrarily-as a
wash. Airline consultant Ted Harris estimates increased trip distance post-dereg-
ulation of 30 percent. Henwood, Deregulation and Beyond, ECON. NOTES, Nov.-Dec.
1989.
,1o Travelers may be forced to fly through, for example, Minneapolis on North.
west, through Atlanta on Delta, through St. Louis on TWA, through Dallas on
American, through Denver on United, and so on.
"4 Kuttner, Plane Truth, NEW REPUBLIC, July 17, 1989, at 21, 22.
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TABLE 1
Yield and Fuel Price Indices(1978=100)
Real Yield (revenue per Real Fuel Fuel Adjusted
passenger mile) Prices Real Yields
1967 129.2 55.9 143.8
1968 123.5 54.1 138.0
1969 121.7 50.9 137.1
1970 117.3 47.0 133.4
1971 117.7 46.2 134.2
1972 114.3 46.3 130.3
1973 112.3 47.7 127.6
1974 116.2 82.1 120.9
1975 111.0 90.2 113.3
1976 110.1 92.5 111.9
1977 109.3 99.3 109.5
1978 100.0 100.0 100.0
1979 94.2 131.7 88.0
1980 104.9 180.1 90.0
1981 106.9 189.8 90.3
1982 95.9 168.6 84.0
1983 91.9 148.0 83.3
1984 91.8 135.7 84.9
1985 85.4 124.0 80.7
1986 77.5 140.7 79.1
1987 76.5 81.6 78.4
1988 78.4 74.9 81.4
Growth Rates:
1967-77 -1.7 5.9 -2.7
1978-88 -2.4 -2.8 -2.0
effect range from five to thirty percent for the average
trip.' 39 For example, the loss of prederegulation Boston-
San Francisco nonstop flights means that some travelers
in the market have no choice but to fly through a hub. 40
The prederegulation Boston-San Francisco passenger
yield was for fewer miles (2,429 to be exact) than the
postderegulation Boston-Dallas-San Francisco trip (3,024
miles, or 24 percent longer).14 ' Due to the greater circu-
ity, consumers paid more in 1988 than they would have
paid projecting the prederegulation trend. The same net
price per passenger mile amounted to a higher charge to
go from point A to point B. Quantitatively, this effect
would mean that the price of a trip in 1988 would be
higher by five to thirty percent - the range reflecting the
wide range in estimates of increased circuity noted above.
In addition to more circuitous flights, deregulation ap-
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Figure 1
Fuel-Adlusted Real Yields (1967-88)







D: I I I I I I I i I I I i I I I I I I I I 1











70  I I I I I







pears to have encouraged a roller coaster ride of high and
low fares - fares which change on an hourly basis, and
include a labyrinth of restrictions, including
nonrefundability. This instability of the rate structure is
reflected in the following chart.
CHART VI: AIR FARE CHANGES UNDER DEREGULATION 142










Hence, the choice among a bewildering array of fares
has undoubtedly made the acquisition of information for
consumers more difficult and more costly. Transaction
costs for both producers and consumers appear to have
grown sharply under deregulation. The nonrefundable
tickets consumers are forced to forfeit must be added on
top of the price they pay for air travel.
The twenty-eight percent fall in real yields that has oc-
curred since deregulation would have occurred under
regulation as well. 143  A widely-cited study of deregula-
tion by Steven Morrison and Clifford Winston of the
Brookings Institution 44 alleges that deregulation is re-
sponsible for a thirty percent real fare reduction. This is
suspiciously close to the actual reduction, a reduction that
cannot properly be attributed to deregulation. They
claim, however, to be doing a "counter-factual" analysis
- Sheeline, Airfares: Up, Up ... and Down Again?, FORTUNE, Dec. 19, 1988, at 9.
1-3 Given, that is, the same fall in real fuel prices as occurred under deregula-
tion and projecting the prederegulation trend behavior of real yields net of fuel
costs.
144 S. MORRISON & C.WINSTON, supra note 139.
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in making their estimate, asking what deregulation did to
fares, holding all other factors constant. If they had actu-
ally done so, their estimate would not be subject to criti-
cism. Their estimate, however, does not hold all other
factors constant. In particular, it does not hold time con-
stant, a crucial consideration in industries which become
more efficient over time and where a time trend proxies
the secular gain in efficiency. The airline industry is such
a progressive sector. Thus, both the naive attribution of
the actual reduction in real fares since 1977 to deregula-
tion, and the more sophisticated "counter-factual" analy-
sis of Morrison and Winston, are misleading. The average
real fare per mile was not lower in 198814 5 as a result of
deregulation. The real fare per trip was actually higher
(by as much as thirty percent) due to the greater circuity
attributable to hub and spoking. Moreover, the volatility
and associated transaction costs were higher as well. In
addition, the good passengers were buying prior to dereg-
ulation is not the same good we buy today - it is signifi-
cantly lower in quality, adding insult to injury.
C. Quality Disintegration: Ticket Restriction and Delays
The average fare reductions seen during deregulation
are a reflection not of lower unrestricted first class or
coach fares, but of the enormous increase in discounting
(from 48.2 percent of all revenue passenger miles in 1979
to ninety-one percent in 1988).46 The discount fare,
however, is a lower-quality good in many respects. Many
discount fares are burdened, for example, with time re-
strictions of various sorts, advance purchase require-
ments, and nonrefundability. If instead of looking at the
average fare paid regardless of quality, one were to treat
each fare category as a different good - which goes too
far in the other direction, but is instructive nonetheless -
the behavior of fares appears dramatically worse under de-
'4 Furthermore, the average 1989 real fare per mile is estimated to be 4.6 per-
cent higher.
14i AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION, AIR TRANSPORT 1989 (1989).
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regulation. Indeed,full fares have risen 156 percent since
1978, double the rate of growth of the Consumer Price
Index. As noted by Brenner, "Getting a fifty percent dis-
count is no bargain, when it's calculated from a list price
that was first raised 200 percent or more. 147
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), in the air trans-
port component of the Consumer Price Index (CPI),
prices a fixed bundle of fares in different fare categories
- first class, discount first class, coach and discount coach
- to construct an index of air fares.' 48 Figures 3149 and
4150 show the behavior of this index over the period 1967-
1988 after adjusting for inflation and, for Figure 4 only,
for changes in real fuel prices. The index rises dramati-
cally after deregulation in both cases. Prior to deregula-
tion, this index of airfares was either flat or falling,
depending on whether the measure is adjusted for fuel
price changes. In either case, however, real fares rose fifty
percent after deregulation. Given that the mix of discounted
versus undiscounted traffic has remained roughly flat (at
ninety percent) in recent years,' -5 the postderegulation
behavior of this mix-held-constant measure of airfares
does not augur well for consumers' in the future.
The changing mix of air travel towards discounted fare
categories thus entails some deterioration in quality. Per-
haps more important, however, is the increase in delays
and schedule uncertainty that pertains to flying, in any
category, under deregulation. The opportunity cost of air
travel - the time we lose stranded at airports, imprisoned
in aircraft, or routed through circuitous hub connections
,47 Brenner, Airline Deregulation-A Case Study in Public Policy Failure, 16 TRANSP.
LJ. 179 (1988).
148 Bureau of Labor Statistics.
'9 Id.
- Telephone interview with Doug Henwood, editor of the LEFr BUSINESS OB-
SERVER. Doug Henwood has been a voice crying in the wilderness about the dis-
parity between this data and usually-cited industry data. See Henwood, supra note
136. The author also wishes to thank Dale Smith of the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, who kindly provided the data and patiently explained the methodology em-
ployed to get it.
M' AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION, supra note 143.
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AIRLINE DEREGULATION
- seems to have increased significantly under deregula-
tion. The widely acclaimed Brookings Institution study
on airline deregulation by Steven Morrison and Clifford
Winston alleged that consumers save $6 billion annually
as a result of deregulation. This alleged savings is com-
prised of fare discounts and opportunity cost savings real-
ized as a result of "improved service convenience [to
business travelers] attributable to the accelerated devel-
opment of hub-and-spoke operations and to frequency
improvements in low-density markets."'' 52 Of the $6 bil-
lion, approximately $4 billion is attributable to these al-
leged opportunity cost savings."' Ample reason exists to
doubt that consumers have saved anything from lower
fares, let alone $2 billion. Overall, the study maintained
that airline service had not declined since deregulation
began, but because of additional frequencies, had actually
improved. Ostensibly, business travelers save time be-
cause they have more frequencies from which to choose.
Most business travelers, if polled, would find such an as-
sumption implausible.
By focusing on the number of flights in larger markets
as the dominant measure of airline service, the Brookings
Study appears to have missed the effect that most real-
world flyers see. Whatever the improvements in the rate
structure since deregulation, the consensus is that service
has declined significantly. While consistently measured
data on delays over a long time period is not available, the
epidemic of delays which pervades the airline industry
seems actually to have imposed significant opportunity
costs, not benefits. Because of the undependability of air-
line schedules, many business travelers find that they
must arrive in a city the evening before a business meet-
ing in order to ensure timeliness. 15 4 Moreover, the delays
experienced at congested airports constitute the other
side of the coin of the frequency improvements in thin
" S. MORRISON & C. WINSTON, supra note 136, at 35.
i,5 Id.
"4 Gridlock!, TiME (Sept. 12, 1988), at 52, 55.
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markets noted by Brookings. Both the decline in service
and delays due to congestion result, arguably, from the
same phenomenon: the move to hub and spoking. As
Brenner notes:
The very increase in hub-and-spoke frequencies which
played so large a part in the study's calculations has been
an important contributor to the congestion and delays
which by 1987 had become a matter of widespread con-
cern. While reducing the time interval between published
departure times, the increased hub-and-spoke frequencies
have increased the actual delay time at the gate, and in
runway queues - a form of lost time that is especially
costly to business traveler productivity. 155
Many airlines amended their schedules in 1988 to in-
corporate anticipated delays. Initially, this brought an
"improvement" in on-time performance by airlines, as
measured by the FAA.' 56 Despite this scheduling effort,
delay figures in late 1988 were significantly higher than
the year before. 5 7 Moreover, delays for the first nine
months of 1989 were twenty-two percent higher than the
same period the preceding year.1 58
Even accounting for lost time, for which there is some
equivalent dollar measure, we do not take into account
the other, less measurable, costs to society of deregula-
tion. The aggravation and anxiety many travelers suffer
because of delays, congestion, and a narrower margin of
safety cannot easily be calculated. The Brookings study in
fact explicitly omitted the psychic costs to the actual busi-
ness traveler; the study's measure encompasses only the
monetary "savings" to the businesses that employ the in-
creasingly harried travelers. 59
Brenner, supra note 20, at 223.
The FAA counts only nonmechanical delays of more than 15 minutes in its
measurements.
1.17 Dahl & Valente, Airline Delays Rise Sharply After Earlier Improvement, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 23, 1988, at BI, col. 5.
,- Winans, Flight Delays Surge; Airlines Blamed by FAA, Wall St.J., Nov. 3, 1989, at
BI, col. 6.
... See S. MORRISON AND C. WINSTON, supra note 139, at 16. In their model,
"[T]he mode choice by pleasure travelers is based on utility-maximizing behavior;
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D. The Emerging Oligopoly
The price benefits many consumers enjoyed under de-
regulation were a short-term phenomenon. 60 The trend
under airline deregulation seems to be toward an oligop-
oly of megacarriers. Prices fell sharply during the first
several years of deregulation, a reflection of the down-
ward pricing spiral of head-to-head, destructive competi-
tion. As carriers became adept at seizing monopoly
market opportunities by merging and creating hub domi-
nance, and, as weaker rivals fell into bankruptcy, prices
began to surge upward. Since early 1988, coach fares in
many markets have increased by more than fifty per-
cent.' 6' Between September 1988 and February 1989, the
largest carriers announced four fare increases, and, since
Eastern's bankruptcy in March 1989, several more carriers
have increased fares. 16 2
The data on revenue per passenger mile for 1989 imply
an estimated rise in inflation-adjusted yields of .94 per-
cent for the year. At the same time real fuel prices rose by
7.74 percent, and the fuel share of costs was about 14.
percent. Adjusting for fuel price increases places the in-
crease in fuel-adjusted real yields at .17 percent 6 3 - an
historical outlier. (Compare Figure 1.) Since real fares
net of fuel trended downward prior to deregulation at 2.7
the choice by business travelers on cost-minimization behavior by their firms." Id. (em-
phasis added).
"it, Paradoxically, higher ticket prices are a mixed blessing. The unprecedented
economic anemia created by deregulation deprived the airline industry of suffi-
cient resources to replace aging aircraft. As the skin peeled off the aging jets, a
chilling realization swept over the industry that it may be time to retire them.
Higher profits will enhance the industry's ability to retire old aircraft and spend
more on maintenance. While there is no guarantee that airline executives will so
invest their healthier profits, if we are to avoid a series of aviation catastrophes,
they need to do both.
-t Rose & Dahl, Skies Are Deregulated, But Just Try Starting a Sizeable New Airline,
Wall St. J., July 19, 1989, at At, col. 6.
162 See Happiness Is a Cheap Seat, THE EcONOMiST, Feb. 4, 1989, at 68.
" Estimate based on the percentage change 1988-1989 in the year-to-date
nominal yield through October and the percentage change 1988-1989 in an aver-
age monthly fuel prices through October, from ATA; and the monthly average
through October for the CPI from the BLS. See Appendix, infra for details.
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percent a year, and consumers in 1988 paid the same real
yield net-of-fuel they would have paid had the prederegu-
lation trend continued, it follows that in 1989 consumers
are estimated to be paying roughly 2.6 percent more than
they would be paying under the prederegulation trend
per mile. Thus, anywhere from ten to thirty-six percent
more per trip will be paid, given the range of estimates for
the effect of deregulation on circuity.
Even without the estimated 1989 data, the effect of con-
solidation in the industry appears in the behavior of the
annual percentage change in fuel-adjusted real yields
before and after deregulation, graphed in Figure 5. t64
Before deregulation, real yields were decelerating
slightly, but not significantly. Deregulation, after a one-
time drop in the rate of change, has imparted a significant
upward trend to the series, with the percentage increase
in yields going up by .84 percent each year after deregula-
tion, instead of the .13 percent drop seen prior to
deregulation.165
The principal opportunities for low prices in the 1990's
will be for discretionary travelers taking one-stop flights
(via hubs) between large cities at off-peak times. 166 The
average air passenger in 1989 is paying roughly 2.6 percent
more per mile than he or she would have paid without
deregulation. Furthermore, this differential is growing.
Passengers are flying more miles than they would have
flown prior to deregulation; passengers are flying in fare
categories with more restrictions; and, passengers seem to
be experiencing more actual delays than they would have
prior to deregulation. In short, passengers are paying
more and enjoying it less. In addition, service has deteri-
orated along many dimensions.
Air Transport Association and author's calculations.
"' See Appendix, infra, at Table A-1, equation 4.
Pelline, supra note 46, at 8.
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V. SERVICE
A. Small Community Service
Transportation deregulation has meant isolation for
many of America's rural communities. While deregula-
tion has created a class of beneficiaries, consumers in
small towns and rural communities are not among them.
Today, in many instances, small town consumers pay
much higher prices for poorer service. 67 With the elimi-
";7 See Dempsey, The Dark Side of Deregulation: Its Impact On Small Communities, 39
ADMIN. L. REV. 445 (1987). After promulgation of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980,
more than 1,200 communities lost all rail service. Id. at 451 n.26. Following the
enactment of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, more than 4,500 communi-
ties lost bus service, while fewer than 900 gained bus service. Id. at 461. Even
Kahn saw a need for economic regulation to protect service to small communities,
saying, "I'm not sure I would ever have deregulated the buses because the bus is a
lifeline of many small communities for people to get to the doctor or to the Social
Security office." Kahn Oral Testimony, supra note 27, at 6337.
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nation of entry and exit regulation, airlines have been free
to reduce their level of service to less lucrative communi-
ties and focus their energies and equipment on more
profitable market opportunities. 68 The result of airline
deregulation "is that many small communities have exper-
ienced a drastic reduction or deterioration in air ser-
vice."' 69 In the first year of deregulation, 260 cities
suffered a deterioration in air service, a disproportionate
number of them being small towns. 70  Seventy of the
communities receiving some service now receive no ser-
vice. 17 1 In the first two years of deregulation more than
100 communities lost all scheduled service. 72
Professors Stephenson and Beier note that "deregula-
tion has accelerated the withdrawal from smaller commu-
nities and ... there has been a concomitant reduction in
the frequency of direct flights in those markets.' 73 This
is a surprising consequence of deregulation, since section
, As one source noted:
One clear pattern emerges from the studies on the impacts of dereg-
ulation in different public utility industries: small communities and
rural areas have often paid a heavy price. Many small communities
and rural areas have lost all of their passenger transportation serv-
ices; many others have had their services reduced significantly. In
addition, the costs of both passenger transportation and telephone
services have increased, often substantially, in these areas. The im-
plications of the loss of services and increases in costs in small com-
munities are significant. Many of these communities are trying to
attract new businesses and keep existing businesses and residents
from moving away.
COLORADO STATE AUDITOR, PERFORMANCE OF THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
39 (1988).
-!, Note, Airline Deregulation and Service To Small Communities, 57 N. D. L. REV. 607
(1981). "One of the most controversial results [of airline deregulation] is that
many small communities have experienced a drastic reduction or deterioration in
air service." Id. at 608.
170 See CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, REPORT ON AIRLINE SERVICE, FARES, TRAFFIC,
LOAD FACTORS AND MARKET SHARES 43-50 (1979).
17, Meyer, Section 419 of the Airline Deregulation Act: What Has Been the Effect On Air
Service to Small Communities?, 47J. AIR L. & COM. 151, 180-81 (1981).
172 Havens & Heymsfeld, Small Community Air Service Under the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978, 46J. AIR L. & COM. 641, 673 (1981).
,7. Stephenson & Beier, The Effects of Airline Deregulation on Air Service to Small
Communities, 20 TRANSP. J. 54, 57 (1981).
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419 of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 t74 provided
for a ten year program of federal subsidies in an attempt
to preserve essential air service to small communities.' 75
Kahn insists that small communities have not suffered
under deregulation. He points out that not a single com-
munity receiving certificated 176 service in 1978 has lost
service. 177 The Essential Air Services (EAS) program has
assured subsidies to many small communities. 7 8 The De-
partment of Transportation, however, has recently an-
nounced its intention to drop a number of small cities
from the EAS program. Absent the subsidies, deregula-
tion would likely have deprived most of these communi-
ties of all service. Cities not previously certificated were
ineligible for the subsidies. Hence, the EAS program may
have hastened the abandonment of the small towns served
by noncertificated commuter airlines. As the large carri-
ers left the small cities over which they held operating au-
thority for denser markets, the commuter airlines shifted
their operations to take advantage of the new subsidies
and exited towns ineligible for subsidies.
In many small towns, the larger airlines have disap-
peared and have been replaced by smaller commuter car-
riers, offering inferior levels of comfort, convenience, and
safety. Small towns have seen a reduction in flights to all
but medium and large hub cities.' 79 From 1977 to 1984,
,74 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1982).
17- Id. § 1389.
176 For those communities losing service, i.e., there was no requirement that
these communities be served prior to deregulation as there was for communities
with so-called "certificated" service.
177 Kahn Oral Testimony, supra note 28, at 6247.
178 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEREGULATION 31-32 (1985) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT]. Under section 419 of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, small
community subsidies were to last until 1988, when they were extended by Con-
gress. See supra note 1, § 419 (stating the guidelines for compensation with regard
to small community air service). In 1985, 142 communities were receiving subsi-
dized service under the EAS program. GAO REPORT, at 31-32. In 1989, the DOT
announced its intention to eliminate subsidies to several cities. No doubt, most
will lose air service altogether if federal economic subsidies dry up. Id.
179 As used in this commentary "hub" and "non-hub" do not refer to carrier
hubs but to the definitions in the airport classification scheme used by DOT. In
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flights between small hubs declined 2.9 percent; flights
between small and nonhub cities fell 16.9 percent; and,
flights between nonhub cities dropped 6.9 percent.180
Deregulation has also caused the transportation net-
work to shrink. In 1978, 515 nonhub communities were
receiving air service. By 1987, 313 (60.8 percent) nonhub
communities experienced declines in flight frequency,
144 (28 percent) lost all service, and only thirty-two (6.2
percent) enjoyed new service.' In 1978, nonhubs ac-
counted for twenty-three percent of all departures. In
1987, they were responsible for only sixteen percent. In
1978, nonhubs had 29,543 flights a week; in 1987,
29,271.182 Clearly, since deregulation, a qualitative dete-
rioration of service to small communities has occurred. 83
With the use of smaller aircraft, some communities enjoy
more frequent departures, but suffer a decrease in the
number of seats.1 8 4 By 1987, seats per week in flights
from smaller communities had dropped 17.4 percent, re-
flecting the departure of pre-deregulation jet aircraft, and
their replacement with post-deregulation turboprop air-
craft.'8 5 Paradoxically, the nation's transportation system
is shrinking at a time when its population is increasing.
Many passengers complain that the smaller, unpres-
surized aircraft used by the commuter airlines are less
comfortable. 86 Passengers also appear to be dissatisfied
that scheme, a hub airport is an airport that handles at least one percent of all
enplanements nationwide.
18o Deregulation Focus, supra note 51, at Supp. B.
'' See CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, REPORT ON AIRLINE SERVICE, FARES, TRAFFIC
LOAD FACTORS, AND MARKET SHARES 32 (Sept. 1, 1984). This data is no longer
reported by the CAB, but has been updated to June, 1987 using information re-
ported in the Official Airline Guide. OFFICIAL AIRLINE GUIDE (June 1, 1987); see
also A. GOETZ, THE EFFECT OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION ON AIR SERVICE TO SMALL
AND MEDIUM-SIZED COMMUNITIES: CASE STUDIES IN NORTHEASTERN OHIO 35
(1987) (Ph. D. Dissertation).
'82 Goetz & Dempsey, Airline Deregulation Ten Years After: Something Foul in the Air,
54J. AIR L. & COM. 927, 946-47 (1989).
183 See GAO REPORT, supra note 178, at 73.
' Id.; Meyer, supra note 171, at 181.
83 Meyer, supra note 171, at 181.
Oster, Jr. & Zorn, Deregulation and Commuter Airline Safety, 49 J. AIR L. & COM.
315, 316 (1984).
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with the service schedules and flight delays associated
with commuter airlines. 8 7 Commuter airlines are cer-
tainly less safe. Depending upon how the records are
measured, commuter airlines have a safety record from
three to thirty-seven times worse than those of established
jet airlines. 88 Author John Nance summarized the rea-
sons for the deterioration of safety resulting from the sub-
stitution of inferior commuter carrier service for
scheduled airlines:
The [commuter airlines] are usually less sophisticated, less
well equipped, largely unpressurized, and much smaller
than main-stream jetliners. Many are devoid of not only
restrooms, they are also devoid of radar, devoid of decent
cockpit communications, devoid of sophisticated flight in-
struments, devoid of those elements that are part of the
safety buffer which all of us as Americans have come to
expect of our air transportation system, whether we are
boarding in a rural area or not.
In addition many of these aircraft . . . fly at altitudes
most vulnerable to weather hazards and potential mid-air
collisions. They are maintained by less sophisticated
maintenance departments, they are flown by less exper-
ienced pilots, usually in the first airline job of their
career. 1
89
Service in small communities is also highly unstable.
Service is often suspended until a replacement can be
found for carriers who have declared bankruptcy. 90 Even
deregulation proponent Thomas Gale Moore admits that
forty percent of small communities have suffered both a
loss of air service and a disproportionate increase in ticket
prices since deregulation began.' 9' Similarly, Professor
187 See Ahmed, Air Transportation to Small Communities: Passenger Characteristics and
Perceptions of Service Attributes, 39 TRANSP. Q. 15, 21 (1984).
'- See Oster, Jr. & Zorn, Airline Deregulation, Commuter Safety, and Regional Air
Transportation, 14 GRowrH AND CHANCE 3, 7 (1983).
Nance Testimony, supra note 126, at 81-82.
Kihl, The Impacts of Deregulation on Passenger Transportation in Small Towns, 42
TRANSP. Q 243, 248 (1988).
-, Moore, U.S. Airline Deregulation: Its Effects On Passengers, Capital, and Labor, 29
J.L. & EcON. 1, 15, 18 (1986).
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Addus observes that "[a]s a result of airline deregulation
fares for traveling between small points have in-
creased rapidly; and commuter air carrier fares are re-
ported to be particularly high in most cases." 1 92
Assessing the quantitative and qualitative impacts of de-
regulation, one commentator noted that "smaller commu-
nities are receiving markedly worse air service than
existed prior to deregulation."' 93
The loss of service has had an unhealthy ripple effect on
the economy of these communities. In addition to in-
creasing transportation costs for companies already doing
business in small communities, deregulation has made
those communities unattractive for the location of new
business. 194 A survey of executives of the 500 largest
American corporations reveals that eighty percent would
not locate in an area which did not have reasonably avail-
able scheduled airline service.195
B. Big Community Service
Not only has airline service into and out of small towns
deteriorated, the national system of air travel appears to
have declined significantly in quality from the high levels
enjoyed prior to deregulation. Even travelers who can get
a super-saver fare find that the product they buy today is
inferior to that which they could purchase before deregu-
lation. Kahn again gives us "before" and "after" snap-
shots. Testifying before the House Budget Committee in
1977, Kahn summarized the state of the airline industry
prior to deregulation as follows:
[t]he industry has under regulation experienced a very sat-
isfactory growth. I don't think it can be denied that airline
192 Addus, Subsidizing Air Service to Small Communities, 39 TRANSP. Q 537, 549
(1985).
'9- Meyer, supra note 171, at 182; see also, S. TOLCHIN & M. TOLCHIN, DISMAN-
TLING AMERICA: THE RUSH TO DEREGULATE 245-46 (1983).
'",4 Meyer, supra note 171, at 175.
-.5 The Economic Impact of Federal Airline Transportation Policies on East Tennessee:
Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Budget, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1985) (testi-
mony of Eugene Joyce).
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service has been widely extended, that the quality is good,
and it is a matter of historical fact that the real price of
airline service has declined in the last four decades, and
that is a very satisfactory record.' 96
In contrast, Kahn made the following observations of the
nature of airline service ten years later:
The quality of the air travel experience has, however,
clearly deteriorated - congestion, delays, and customer
complaints have increased sharply in recent years - and
deregulation bears a large part of the responsibility.' 9 7
On a more popular level, a recent editorial in the Washing-
ton Post summed up what many firmly perceive to be the
results of deregulation: "Airline Service Has Gone to
Hell."1 98
Flying has become a rather unpleasant experience. The
planes are filthy, delayed, cancelled, and overbooked.
Luggage disappears and the food is processed cardboard.
Chronic delays, missed connections, and circuitous rout-
ing are all products of hub-and-spoking, adopted by every
major airline. Hub-and-spoking was pioneered for pack-
ages, by Federal Express. Human beings subjected to hub-
and-spoking since deregulation are much less enthusiastic
about it than the inanimate objects changing planes in
Memphis every night without complaint.
In a recent survey, fifty percent of the consumers inter-
viewed said that airline service had declined since deregu-
lation. Less than 'twenty percent said service had
improved. Among the complaints were late departures,
-.i Economic Aspects of Federal Regulation on the Transportation Industry, Hearings
Before the Task Force on Tax Expenditures, Government Organization, and Regulation,
House Budget Comm., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1977).
'97 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATON XXii (1988). Kahn, however, has
been inconsistent on this subject, saying in 1986, "in most instances the quality-
and especially the variety [of service]- has sharply improved [under deregula-
tion]." Kahn, Theory and Application, supra note 11, at 179. Kahn also criticized the
"widespread but nevertheless erroneous' popular supposition" that the quality of
service had deteriorated. All That, supra note 11, at 97.
i's Rowen, Airline Service Has Gone to Hell, Wash. Post, July 23, 1987, at A21 col.
1; see also, Dempsey, Consumers Pay More to Receive A Lot Less, USA Today, July 16,
1987, at 8A.
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crowded seating, long check-in lines, unappetizing food,
overbooked aircraft, and unacceptably long waits for bag-
gage.' 99 Another survey, of 15,000 frequent flyers, found
even more negative attitudes toward the impact of dereg-
ulation. Sixty-eight percent said that deregulated air ser-
vice was "less convenient and enjoyable." Only nineteen
percent thought it more convenient and enjoyable. 0 0
Still another survey, of 461 members of the Executive
Committee (a group of corporate presidents and chief ex-
ecutives), revealed that thirty-six percent had lost job effi-
ciency because of air travel delays.20 ' Many said they took
the precaution of arriving in a city on the night before an
appointment rather than risk flight delays or cancella-
tions, thereby saddling their firms with the cost of a hotel
room.
These results parallel those of the United States De-
partment of Transportation. DOT data reveal that con-
sumer complaints about airline delays, lost baggage,
cancellations, refunds on discounted tickets, and inade-
quate availability of nonsmoking seats have soared in re-
cent years. 2  Reaching a low of 7,326 in 1983,
complaints filed against United States airlines with the
DOT skyrocketed to 40,985 in 1987.203
' .? The Big Trouble With Air Travel, CONSUMER REPORTS, June 1988, at 362, 363.
"' Brenner, supra note 19, at 223.
"",I, Gridlock!, supra note 149, at 55.
2,,2 Brenner, supra note 19, at 215.
2w, See CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD CONSUMER COMPLAINT REPORT 13B (1982),
Coleman, No Silver Lining Expected to Brighten Airlines' Stormy Skies, MARKETING
NEWS, vol. 21, no. 20, Sept. 25, 1987, at 1, col. 1. The top ten complaints, in
order of number registered, were:
* Flight Problems: Cancellations, delays, or any other deviation from schedule.
* Baggage: Claims for lost, damaged, or delayed baggage; charges for excess
baggage; carry-on problems; and difficulties with airline claim procedures.
* Refunds: Problems in obtaining refunds for unused or lost tickets or fare
adjustments.
* Customer service: Rude or unhelpful employees, inadequate meals or cabin
service, and treatment of delayed passengers.
* Reservations, ticketing and boarding: Airline or travel agent mistakes in reser-
vations and ticketing; problems in making reservations and obtaining tickets due
to busy phone lines or waiting in line; delays in mailing tickets; and problems
boarding the aircraft (except oversales).
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Consumer abuse does not stop with miserable service.
Without government oversight, airlines freely engage in
bait-and-switch advertising, deliberate overbooking,
unrealistic scheduling, and demand based flight
cancellations 204
Why has the deregulated market failed to correct this
deterioration in service? Some have suggested that ser-
vice deterioration is attributable to the decline in profit-
ability of firms caused by the "destructive competition"
unleashed by deregulation. °5 Hence, carriers have not
had the resources to staff flights with more flight attend-
ants than the FAA minimum, to staff ticket counters or
baggage areas adequately, to provide better food, to avoid
deliberate overbooking or unrealistic scheduling, to buy
new aircraft or even to clean them properly. While some
airlines are worse than others, the decline appears to be
nearly universal.
Another explanation of the market's failure may be
found in the nature of the item being sold. When a con-
sumer purchases a manufactured product, he can examine
it in a retail store before he spends his money; he can pull
it off the shelf, turn it over, and make some assessment of
its quality. When a consumer buys a service like transpor-
tation, its quality, beyond providing for the mere move-
ment of the traveler's body from point A to point B, is
* Oversales: All bumping problems, whether or not the airline complied with
DOT oversale regulations.
* Other: Cargo Problems, security, airport facilities, claims for bodily injury,
and other miscellaneous problems.
* Fares: Incorrect or incomplete information about fares, discount fare condi-
tions and availability, overcharges, fare increases, and the level of fares in general.
* Smoking: Inadequate segregation of smokers from nonsmokers, failure of the
airline to enforce no-smoking rules, and objections to the rules.
* Advertising: Ads that are unfair, misleading, or offensive to consumers.
Id. at col. 3; see also DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AIR TRAVEL MONTHLY CON-
SUMER COMPLAINT REPORT 1 (1988).
2- As the Wall StreetJournal observed: "Complaints about service are at an all-
time high, with flight delays and cancellations provoking protest chants and even
violence among angry passengers." McGinley, Bad Air Service Prompts Call for
Changes, Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1987, at 29, col. 3.
205 See Brenner, supra note 20, at 201.
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amorphous. The consumer is purchasing a "credence
good," a product for which quality is important but diffi-
cult to assess prior to consumption.20 6
When booking a flight, most consumers do some price
shopping. Where a competitive alternative exists, some
measure of price competition under deregulation may ex-
ist, and those who price shop usually opt for the lower
fare (although frequent flyer mileage programs and travel
agent commission overrides may militate against the low-
est price). Travelers who have been through the ordeal of
a hub connection may ask for a nonstop if available, or a
one-stop, if not. Some may also shop for a convenient de-
parture. Beyond that, few consumers ask
(1) what kind of aircraft is being flown, how old is it, and
when was it overhauled and cleaned; (2) how often is this
flight late, and by how much, on average; (3) by what per-
centage of passengers do you usually overbook the flight;
(4) what percentage of bags are usually lost on the flight,
and if you don't lose them, how long will I have to wait at
destination for my bags; (5) how many flight attendants
are on board, and will I be offered a magazine, pillow, cup
of coffee or bag of peanuts; (6) what's for dinner, and how
tasty is it; (7) what's the average wait in the line at the air-
port; (8) how crowded is the flight and the waiting lounge
at the gate; (9) how much knee and leg room do you give
me between seats; and (10) how comfortable is the seat?
Because most of these questions are not asked by consum-
ers before they purchase their tickets, the market has not
responded to consumer desires for better service. 20 7
VI. SAFETY
Because of the destructive competition unleashed by
20,; C. SMITH, JR., C. SMITHSON & D. WILFORD, MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK
(1989).
207 The U.S. Department of Transportation has authority to protect consumers
from many of these evils, including deliberate overbooking, unrealistic schedul-
ing, and fraudulent ("bait and switch") advertising. The Reagan Administration's




deregulation, overall industry financial performance dur-
ing the first decade of deregulation declined to the point
of inadequacy, despite the fact that the recession of the
early 1980's abated, and fuel prices fell. Poor or nonexis-
tent profits create in management a natural tendency to
curtail costs. Among those which can be significantly di-
minished are maintenance costs (including mechanic's
wages), spare or replacement parts, and idle aircraft time
lost during inspections and maintenance. A decade of
economic anemia naturally deprived carriers of the re-
sources to re-equip with new aircraft, or maintain the wide
margin of safety the public previously enjoyed. As ob-
served by Professor Frederick Thayer, deregulation is
both inefficient and dangerous. °8
Since deregulation, the average age of our nation's air-
craft fleet has grown sharply (see Chart VII). Expendi-
tures for maintenance and the number of mechanics per
aircraft have been reduced. The number of near-misses
has soared. The father of airline deregulation, Alfred
Kahn, now admits that the margin of safety has "possibly"
narrowed since 1978.209 Although fatality statistics merci-
fully have not yet reflected this diminished margin, every
other measure of safety paints a different picture.
In 1987, America endured the largest number of air-
craft accidents since 1974.10 Since deregulation began,
the cockpit crew members fly with less experience, and
hiring standards and the duration and quality of training
have declined.21  For example, in 1983, a prospective pi-
208 Rowen, Airline Deregulation Doesn't Work, Wash. Post, Apr. 8, 1982, at A27,
col. 5.
2- Kahn, A Mixed Bag, supra note 3, at 251; Kahn, All That, supra note 12, at 98
(Kahn noted that the pressure created by competition exerted "on carriers to re-
duce prices and costs, may be inducing them also to cut corners on safety .... " )
In response to a question as to whether the margin of safety had narrowed under
deregulation, Kahn conceded, "No one can deny that, under the pressure of com-
petition, we may be walking on a thinner margin." Interview With Alfred Kahn, USA
Today, Oct. 5, 1988, at 13A.
2 Air Safety Record Worst Since '74, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 13, 1988, at 5.
21, Thomas & McGinley, Airlines' Growth, Pilot Shortage Produce Least Experienced
Crews In Nine Years, Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1987, at 32 col. 3.
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lot needed 2,300 hours of flight time and uncorrected 20/
20 vision to be hired by one of the major airlines. Today,
one needs only 800 hours of flight time and (for all but
one airline) correctable vision. Moreover, commuter car-
riers require a mere 100 hours of experience. Conse-
quently, the number of pilots with fewer than 2,000 hours
of flight time soared from two percent in 1983, to four-
teen percent in 1988.212
The economic anemia unleashed by deregulation has
caused management to push pilots to fly more hours with
less rest. While working longer for less pay may increase
productivity, it can also induce fatigue, which has a nega-
tive impact upon safety. Between 1982 and 1988, fatigue
accounted for two operational errors per week - errors
such as pilots falling asleep in the cockpit, landing on the
wrong runway, or wandering out of assigned flight
paths.2t3
Ninety-seven percent of airline pilots believe that de-
regulation has had an adverse impact on airline safety. 214
Among the problems identified are "lagging and inade-
quate maintenance, pressure to avoid delays, lowered hir-
ing and experience standards for new pilots, increased
use of waivers and exemptions from safety rules, in-
creased flying hours for pilots, [and] the profusion of new,
inexperienced airlines."23 5
Legitimate concerns have also been raised over the
problem of the age and poor maintenance ofjets flown by
unhealthy airlines that lack the financial resources to re-
equip with modern aircraft, or properly maintain their ag-
212 Valente, United's Flight 811 Showed How Vital Capable Pilots Can Be, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 1, 1989, at 1, col. 1. A 26 year old individual with less than 37 hours of
flight time in a DC-9 piloted the Continental Airlines DC-9 that crashed in Denver
during a takeoff in a snowstorm in 1987. The captain had only 33 hours of DC-9
experience. Id. Knox, Policy Shift Silent Factor in Crash?, Rocky Mountain News,
Oct. 4, 1988, at I-B, 2-B. Prior to deregulation, 80 percent of tht nations pilots
had experience as military pilots. Today that number is only 50 percent. Id.
21c. Fatigue Blamed for Dangerous Pilot Errors, Denver Post, Sept. 12, 1988, at 3A,
col. 1.
2, Duffy, View From Cockpit Is Clearly Negative, Denver Post, Dec. 7, 1987, at 2E.
215 Id
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ing fleets.216 The commuter airline industry, plagued
continuously by bankruptcies, is of particular concern as
used, recycled aircraft dominate the fleets of the smaller
217carriers.
The intense competition unleashed by deregulation has
deprived many carriers of the resources with which to re-
place their aging fleets of aircraft. As a consequence, the
average age of the industry's jets grew twenty-one percent
since 1979 to 12.53 years in 1988.218 Today, more than
half the 2,767 jets in service are sixteen years old or
older.21 9 Chart VII provides the average aircraft ages of
the ten major carriers as of March 31, 1989.












While aging aircraft require intensive and costly main-
tenance,221 America's airlines are spending less. Mean-
while their fleets grow steadily older. Resources devoted
by commercial airlines to aircraft maintenance fell thirty
216 Welling, The Airlines'Dilemma: No Cash to Buy Fuel EfficientJets, Bus. WK., Sept.
27, 1982, at 65; P. DEMPSEY, LAw & FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 11, at 90.
217 Dempsey, Collision Course, supra note 42, at 354 n.100.
21, Valente, Harris,Jr. & McGinley, Should Airlines Scrap Their Oldest Planes for Sake
of Safety?, Wall St.J., May 6, 1988, at 1, col. 6.
219 Id. In 1988, 28 percent of the U.S. fleet was more than 20 years old. It is
anticipated that by the year 2000, that number will reach 40 percent.
2'10 Wall St.J., Mar. 31, 1989, at BI, col. 2.
221 Valente, Harris Jr., & McGinley, supra note 218, at 15, col. 1.
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percent during deregulation's first six years. 22 More re-
cent data indicate that airline spending on maintenance
fell from nearly thirteen percent of operating expenses in
1977, to eight percent in 1982. By 1988, this number had
only partially recovered to eleven percent. 223 A survey of
commercial airline pilots reveals that almost half believe
that their companies defer maintenance for an excessive
period of time.224 As Chart VIII reveals, the number of
mechanics per aircraft has declined more than ten percent
on average for the major airlines in the past five years:













Between 1978 and 1987, departures for major airlines
increased by twenty-seven percent.22 6 With airlines fun-
neling their flights into "hub and choke" bottlenecks and
scheduling takeoffs and landings through narrow windows
of time and space, the flight paths of the nation's major
airports are heavily congested during peak periods. Near
misses are soaring. 227 There were 311 near misses during
222 Fishcetti & Perry, Our Burdened Skies, 23 IEEE SPECTRUM 79 (1986).
22 Knox, supra note 212, at 2B.
224 Duffy, supra note 213, at 2E.
225 Valente, How Much Is Spent to Maintain Planes?, Wall St. J., July 19, 1988, at
31, col. 6.
22-; Skies Safe Today, But Turbulence Is Brewing, Rocky Mountain News, May 4,
1988, at 37.
'227 Dempsey, Cross Your Fingers, Hope Not to Die, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 28, 1987,
at 28.
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1982, 475 in 1983, 589 in 1984, 758 in 1985, 840 in 1986,
and 1,058 during 1987.228 The number of near misses has
also skyrocketed in terms of incidents per 100,000 flight
hours. 22 9 Further, one out of every five commercial pilots
experienced a near-miss during a recent two-year period,
and only twenty-five percent of those were reported to the
FAA.23 o
All of this has placed serious strains on the air traffic
control system at a time when it is least capable of han-
dling the surge in demand. In 1981, President Reagan
fired 11,500 striking members of the Professional Air
Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO), leaving the
FAA with only one-third of its work force, and the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) has yet to fully replace
them.2 3' Not only is the system understaffed, but many
airports and navigational facilities are equipped with ob-
solete and aging equipment. The FAA is reputed to be
the largest user of vacuum tubes in the world. Opera-
tional errors, or mistakes by controllers, increased by
twenty percent during the first half of 1987 over the same
period one year earlier.232
Public and media concern over the trimmed margin of
safety has caused the FAA to become more vigilant in en-
forcing its safety regulation, something it was lethargic in
doing during the early years of the Reagan Administra-
tion. The FAA levied significant fines on major airlines by
the end of the Reagan Administration. 33 The FAA dis-
228 Increasing Near-Midair Incidents Spur Drive to Improve A TC Performance, Av. Wx.
& SPACE TECH., AuG. 24, 1987, AT 21-23, (updated by DOT Total Near Midair
Collision (NMAG) Reports (Sept. 30, 1988)).
2211 In 1981, there were 317 hazardous midair incidents (or 0.66 per 100,000
flight hours), 85 critical incidents (0.18 per 100,000), and 230 potential incidents
(0.48 per 100,000 hours). The corresponding figures for 1986 were 642 (1.46),
163 (0.37), and 473 (1.07). Deregulation Focus, supra note 51, at Supp. C.
'-11, 1 in 5 Airline Pilots Has Had Near Collision, Denver Post, Dec 24, 1987, at 2,
col. 1; see also, Increasing, supra note 228, at 127.
" Morganthau, Year of the Near Miss, NEWSWEEK, July 27, 1987, at 20, 22.
2."!Molinari, How Safe Is the Air Traffic Control System?, USA Today, Nov. 1987, at
12, 13.
2- McGinley, Fifteen Airlines Face FAA Fines Totaling About $6.5 Million for Alleged
Violations, Wall St. J., May 12, 1988, at 4, col. 2.
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covered 63,191 safety violations by airlines in 1987, com-
pared to only 28,864 in 1984.234 Nonetheless, a recent
report prepared by the Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) charged that the FAA must improve its safety pre-
cautions. 35 The report found the FAA understaffed in
the number of inspectors, controllers and technicians it
employs, and maintaining inadequate programs to im-
prove the performance of aircraft crews, air-traffic con-
trollers and mechanics. The OTA urged the FAA to
continue surprise inspections, and in particular, to engage
in comprehensive supervision of the commuter airline in-
dustry "during the shakeout expected over the next few
years. 1236
The OTA report also criticized the airline industry.
Although all airlines profess adherence to high safety
standards, the report found significant variations in cor-
porate cultures and maintenance procedures. Professed
adherence to safety "means one thing to a financially well-
off airline with an ample number of landing slots at air-
ports, but something else to a financially strapped airline
that must choose between spending money on discretion-
ary maintenance on aircraft and buying new slots. 23 7
The OTA concluded that "while airline officials are con-
cerned about safety, financial considerations drive many
industry decisions and will continue to do so as long as
strong competition exists among the airlines. 238
The economic strains created by the intense price com-
petition unleashed by deregulation have had a deleterious
effect upon carrier safety. 239 There are two reasons why
24 Ott, supra note 43, at 89.
2.15 U. S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Safe Skies for Tomorrow:
Aviation Safety in a Competitive Environment, OTA-SET-381 (1988) [hereinafter OTA
Report on Airline Safety].
'.6 Id. at 15.
2,7 McGinley, Congressional Report Warns Air Safety May Be Imperiled Without Swift
Action, Wall St. J., July 28, 1988, at 28, col. 3.
21 OTA, Report on Airline Safety, supra note 235, at 13. "[M]any airlines have
lowered hiring standards, [and] increased pilot and mechanic duty time." Id. at
12.
2-19 Dempsey, Collision Course, supra note 42, at 352.
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this has not led to higher fatality levels. First, the aircraft
themselves are over-engineered. Even if maintenance is
deferred and a critical system fails, usually a back-up sys-
tem will fill the void until the plane can land. Even if the
plane becomes a convertible, as did the Aloha Airlines
737 in Hawaii, a good pilot can still land it safely. Second,
there is a higher level of vigilance in the cockpit than
there ever has been. Hub-and-spoking creates intense
congestion, and pilots know if they don't keep a sharp eye
out, a near miss could become an actual hit. Moreover,
pilots are overwhelmingly concerned about the deteriora-
tion of maintenance under deregulation. They watch
more carefully for mechanical problems than they ever
have. Thus, we have been spared the tragedies that the
economic imperatives of deregulation might otherwise
suggest.2 40 The restoration of monopoly, which appears
to be an accomplished fact in the industry, should ease the
pressure to cut corners on safety which results from de-
structive competition, as well as allowing for purchases of
new jets. Consumers, however, will be paying a tribute to
a private monopoly in order to obtain a level of safety
taken for granted prior to deregulation.
VII. REREGULATION: DARE WE SPEAK IT?
After a decade of deregulation many of the essential
presumptions advanced by free market economists re-
garding the nature of an unregulated airline industry have
proven incorrect. Neither the "traditionalist" expectation
that an absence of economies of size would insure a large
number of competitors, nor the nontraditionalist expecta-
tion that markets which were naturally monopolistic or
oligopolistic would nevertheless be contestable due to low
barriers to entry and an absence of sunk entry costs has
been fulfilled.24" '
24o Dempsey, Deregulation, supra note 74, at 147, 151.
241 Many economists have been honest enough to admit that many of the funda-
mental assumptions upon which deregulation theory rested were specious. For
example, Professor Michael Levine, formerly a deputy of Alfred Kahn at the CAB
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Deregulation produced an anemic industry of megacar-
riers providing poor service and highly discriminatory
pricing. Emerging oligopolies and monopolies, as well as
the associated tapping of market power pullulate the ane-
mic condition of the industry. 42 Potential entry seems to
be a weak force for discipline on incumbents due to barri-
ers which are both natural, such as the need to sink costs
in advertising one's service and strategic, such as the crea-
tion of frequent flyer programs which attract passengers
and effectively differentiate the carrier's product. Some
barriers have both an innocent and strategic component.
For instance, hub-and-spoking creates efficiency for the
public despite the enhanced travel circuity for which it is
responsible. Hub-and-spoking, however, also deters new
entry which enhances its value to incumbent carriers, but
not to the public. Consolidation and associated higher
prices may improve the health of the industry, but increas-
ingly, consumers must forego the deep discounts (except
in extremely circumscribed conditions) of which deregula-
tion's proponents have been so proud. In fact, in 1989,
consumers paid some 2.6 percent more for air travel than
they would have paid had the prederegulation downward
trend in real fares continued.
Kahn, although a poor prophet, concedes that
problems have emerged under deregulation. He admits
that many of the fundamental assumptions upon which
deregulation was based were either overstated or errone-
ous, including the nonexistence of economies of scale and
and Texas Air executive, recently wrote: "Deregulation has not brought about its
benefits because deregulated markets work flawlessly or approximate the results
of perfect competition or perfect contestability. This has surprised economists
and analysts such as myself who expected the airline system once deregulated to
exhibit near-textbook degrees of competition." Levine, The Legacy of Airline Dereg-
ulation: Public Benefits, But New Problems, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 9, 1987, at
161.
242 Deregulation allows major airlines to forego competition in smaller markets.
Those airlines "consolidate their strength into regional, hub and market monopo-
lies and oligopolies." Dempsey, Deregulation supra note 74, at 147. In fact, all but
four airports in the United States are controlled by a monopoly. Id.
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scope, as well as of contestability. 243 Kahn has also said
that many predictions as to how deregulation would affect
the transportation industry, labor, and the public they
serve, were overly optimistic.24 4 Nonetheless, he contin-
ues to maintain that, on balance, airline deregulation has
been a success. 45
When asked whether the turmoil in the deregulated
skies alarms him, Kahn, quite surprisingly, answered, "It
is what we intended because we knew that competition
leads to turmoil, that competition is turmoil, and that if
you want predictability and neatness and stability, regu-
late. 2 46 Perhaps by "turmoil" he meant the weeding out
of inefficient operators through a process of social Dar-
winism. Unfortunately, the destructive competition un-
leashed by deregulation negatively affected both the
efficient and inefficient, for it is only the very large and
very strong that survive with any significant market share.
If one must choose between the "turmoil" of the recent
past with all its bankruptcies, discrimination and concen-
tration, and "predictability, neatness and stability," cer-
tainly the better choice is the latter. In the real world,
however, the task is not so much to choose between eco-
nomic abstractions but to fashion an enlightened ap-
proach to bring about the positive attributes of healthy
competition, which include productivity, efficiency, and a
range of price and service options responsive to the de-
mands of consumers. This must be accomplished while
protecting the public against market failure.
Kahn, on occasion, suggests that the government
should become more involved in the airline industry.
Some problems, he acknowledges, which have emerged
"urgently cry out for at least some government reme-
dies. 247 For example, Kahn has called for more stringent
243 Kahn Oral Testimony, supra note 28, at 6247.
244 Id.
24- Kahn, A Mixed Bag, supra note 3, at 230-31.
24,6 Kahn Oral Testimony, supra note 28, at 6245.
247 Air Travel Altered by Deregulation, Denver Post, Oct. 31, 1988, at 9C.
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antitrust and safety regulation. He also acknowledged the
need for additional consumer protection and some con-
trol over the power of the railroad monopolies. Finally,
Kahn has even conceded that some sort of pricing regula-
tion may be appropriate to deal with predatory behavior
by large firms, and that it may be time to consider price
ceilings.2 48 Nonetheless, the transportation industry and
the public it serves would have been spared much of the
"turmoil," if the fundamental assumptions upon which
the deregulators relied had not proven specious, and had
deregulation not been implemented so aggressively.
There are essentially four alternatives for the protec-
tion of economic and social values in an important pri-
vately owned infrastructure industry such as the
transportation industry. They are:
1. Heavy Handed Regulation;
2. Regulatory Reform ("Light Handed," Enlightened
Economic Regulation);
3. Economic Deregulation and Antitrust Regulation;
and
4. Laissez-Faire.
This writer has consistently maintained that the first al-
ternative can be just as debilitating to the infrastructure
and the public it serves as the last alternative. 249 The CAB
of the early 1970s tended to restrict pricing flexibility and
prohibit route rationalization and new entry. Neither
rigid governmental control (such as that which existed at
248 Ex-Official Suggests Lid On Air Fares, Rocky Mountain News, Nov. 5, 1987, at
100. CAB Chairman, Kahn lobbied for price ceilings. As he recently noted:
The original deregulation bill retained a rate regulatory ceiling on
any routes in which a single carrier accounted for 90 percent or
more of the business. As Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, I
testified on behalf of a unanimous board which had adopted the pos-
ture of favoring deregulation, that the ceiling trigger should be
changed to 70 percent. We believed that while entry should be le-
gally free and would be relatively easy, we never thought that would
provide adequate protection in markets that are naturally monopo-
listic or oligopolistic-that just won't support more than one or two
carriers.
Kahn Interview, supra note 36, at 6-7.
2" See Dempsey, The Rise & Fall of the CAB, supra note 6, at 94.
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the CAB in the early 1970s) nor anarchy (which we have
today) is a desirable alternative. The responsible choice is
thus either alternative two or alternative three. This au-
thor suggests that alternative two, enlightened regulation,
is the better approach.250 Kahn, on the other hand, pre-
fers alternative three.2 5'
Kahn suggests that antitrust laws are an adequate sub-
stitute for economic regulation in protecting the public
interest in a number of forums. They are not. As a result
of deregulation, the railroads, airlines, bus and motor car-
riers are now more highly concentrated than at any time
in their history. The move toward merging stems from
the destructive competitive environment of deregulation,
and the economic anemia created by traffic dilution. Fac-
ing the alternative of a merger or eventual bankruptcy,
carriers hemorrhaging dollars quite logically choose the
former option.
Antitrust laws are not an effective deterrent against
such consolidations. While no single airline merger en-
joys antitrust immunity under Section 414 of the Federal
Aviation Act, no one has filed a private antitrust action in
opposition. Nor is it clear that traditional antitrust reme-
dies are socially desirable in cases where significant real
economies of size, scope and density exist, such as in the
air transport industry.
Plaintiffs have employed neither civil nor criminal anti-
trust opportunities to challenge predatory behavior by
larger transportation firms. Contemporary case law con-
cerning predation generally does not favor the plaintiff.252
In addition to the lack of political will exhibited by the
United States Department of Justice during the last dec-
2.5 Dempsey, Market Failure and Regulatory Failure As Catalysts for Political Change:
The Choice Between Imperfect Regulation and Imperfect Competition, 46 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Dempsey, Market Failure].
2.5 Kahn appears to have a particular aversion to economic regulation, describ-
ing regulators as "typically very anal." Kahn Oral Testimony, supra note 28, at
6246.
22 See, e.g., Matsushita Elect. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986).
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ade in pursuing antitrust violations other than price fix-
ing, several disincentives to the use of antitrust by private
parties exist as a civil means of correcting market failure.
Such disincentives include the high cost and consumption
of time in pursuing an antitrust action, the significant evi-
dentiary hurdles, and the fact that contemporary case law
is not particularly sympathetic to plaintiffs alleging preda-
tion. An aggrieved party stands a better chance of pre-
vailing if he follows on the coattails of a successful
government civil or criminal action, in part because of the
assembling of a complex evidentiary record. In any event,
the lack of contemporary Justice Department enthusiasm
for areas of antitrust other than price fixing makes such an
alternative less feasible. Building such a record from
scratch can be extremely expensive. Moreover, criminal
antitrust enforcement may be an inappropriate approach
to the airline industry with its significant natural monop-
oly characteristics and susceptibility to destructive compe-
tition. Nor do the antitrust laws provide any protection
against pricing or service discrimination. This is due to
the fact that the Robinson-Patman Act is inapplicable to
the airline industry because the Act prohibits discrimina-
tion in the sale of goods, not services.
Hence, antitrust is an inadequate substitute for respon-
sible economic regulation in protecting public interest
values of assuring a healthy, competitive environment and
advancing social objectives which do not find a high prior-
ity in a laissez-faire regime. Kahn is critical of what he re-
fers to as the "ideologues of laissez-faire."253  Kahn's
alternative, however, is not pragmatically available at this
point in our legal history, and even if it were, it would
probably not be desirable. Stripping away economic regu-
lation inevitably subjects the industry and the public it
serves to the fourth alternative, laissez-faire.
The net result of deregulation is that the five member
Civil Aeronautics Board is now replaced by the Chief Ex-
2" Airline Deregulation 1987, supra note 37, at 64.
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ecutive Officers of the largest airlines. Using the era of
-the railroad robber barons as an example, it is evident
that the transportation industry is subject to too many so-
cial and economic externalities to leave it to the manipula-
tion of a handful of unconstrained monopolists. The
quasi-public utility nature of the transportation industry
suggests the need for enlightened regulation in the pub-
lic's interest.
It is time to roll back deregulation, re-establish the ap-
propriate role of government in leveling the playing field,
correct market failure, and protect those economic and
social interests which do not find a high priority in a laisez-
faire regime. Enlightened regulation provides an equita-
ble balance of public interest objectives with market im-
peratives in those singular cases where the market alone
produces socially undesirable results. Ideally, it can be
designed to steer the delicate course between laissez-faire
(and hence market failure) and heavy-handed
regulation. 254
VIII. PUTTING THE AIRLINES BACK ON COURSE: A
MODEST LEGISLATIVE AGENDA
To suggest a need for reform of deregulation is not to
say that we need to return to the tight-fisted regulatory
regime of the early 1970s.255 Such a move would be im-
possible in any event, because of the profound structural
changes that have occurred. CAB chairman Kahn, true to
his promise stated: "We will so scramble the eggs that no
one will be able to put them back into their shells
again. '1 56 The American public, however, needs enlight-
2- Dempsey, Market Failure, supra note 250, at 3.
255 Dempsey, The Rise & Fall of the CAB, supra note 6, at 173-74.
256Having scrambled the eggs, it is a bit obscene for Kahn to now claim that if
deregulation is a failed experiment, we can simply re-regulate. Kahn said,
way back in 1977-78, I recognized the possibility that the price com-
petition we expected deregulation to release would prove to be only
temporary, with the industry eventually settling back into non-price-
competitive oligopoly; my response was that there was no reason for
the government to continue systematically to suppress competition
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ened governmental supervision to correct for market fail-
ure and achieve desirable social benefits.
Congress also acknowledges the need for reform. The
100th Congress attempted such reform by proposing an
air travelers' "Bill of Rights." The bill would have re-
quired airlines to publish statistics summarizing delays,
number of passengers bumped, lost bags, and other con-
sumer complaints. This spurred the lethargic DOT to
promulgate regulations providing for monthly disclosure
of consumer information, and announce possible sanc-
tions including modest penalties for flights cancelled for
reasons other than mechanical problems or weather. The
Essential Air Service subsidies for small towns have also
been extended.
The larger questions must now be considered: entry,
pricing, antitrust, small community access, safety, con-
sumer protection and regulatory reorganization.
A. Entry
The most difficult question - whether entry should be
regulated - should be addressed first. A good argument
could be made that thin air transport markets capable of
supporting only a single carrier are similar to natural mo-
nopolies, and thus should be limited to a single regulated
firm much like local electric, telephone and gas distribu-
tion markets. Since only one firm can survive, it is waste-
ful to have two or more airlines fight it out to the death.
If entry regulation is imposed, monopoly pricing must,
of course, be constrained. Hence, rate regulation is es-
sential. But limiting entry induces lethargy over the long
term. To prevent this, the regulatory agency might issue
a certificate for a specific term of years, and be willing to
replace the incumbent with a more vigorous firm at the
end of its term if the incumbent appears inefficient and
uneconomical.
in the first place; and if indeed that eventually ever came to pass, that
would be the time to consider re-regulating.
Buckley, Airlines Invite Talk of Regulation, Rocky Mountain News,July 6, 1989, at 35.
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Spokes between rival carrier hubs may be, oddly
enough, natural duopolies. Since only carriers with be-
yond-segment feed into the city-pair market can ordinarily
survive, those without a hub in least at one of the end
points will likely fail.
A more difficult question with no apparent solution is
whether entry should be limited in other markets. En-
hanced competition undoubtedly benefits consumers (at
least in the short run) as carriers enter into a competitive
war of price discounting. Current competition, however,
seems to be destructive in nature. Allowing competition
to go unchecked causes carriers to hemorrhage dollars
unduly, slash service, defer maintenance and replacement
of aged equipment, and spiral downward into bankruptcy
or, as an ultimate alternative, merge into larger and larger
firms.
Kahn advocates the repeal of the cabotage laws so that
foreign airlines can compete in domestic markets. This
only reintroduces the problems of destructive competi-
tion from which the industry is only now escaping, while
creating additional national security concerns. To place
this proposal into perspective requires one only to imag-
ine a world in which there had never been cabotage laws.
Specifically, suppose the United States' domestic air pas-
senger or cargo industry had in 1938 been dominated by
Lufthansa and Japan Air Lines.
Similar to local distribution of electric power, gas and
telephone services, airline hubs provide certain system
distribution efficiencies and economies of scale. As effi-
cient monopolies, they should therefore be allowed to ex-
ist. Megacarrier domination of multiple hubs, however,
reduces the likelihood of new entry, pricing, and service
innovations.
Imposing a limit on the number of hubs a carrier may
dominate is one means of enhancing national and city-
pair competition while recognizing to some extent the
true efficiency advantages associated with hub and spok-
ing. Assume, for example, that Congress passed a law
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prohibiting an airline from dominating more than sixty
percent of the gates, landings, takeoffs and passengers at
more than a single airport, thereby limiting the airline to a
monopoly at only one airport.
Further assume that an airline with such a hub monop-
oly would also be prohibited from having more than
twenty-five percent of the gates, landings, takeoffs and
passengers at any other airport. Several benefits result
from such a situation. Carriers are forced to divest them-
selves of all hubs but one. For example, Northwest Air-
lines (which today dominates the hubs of Minneapolis/St.
Paul, Detroit and Memphis) might be split into three
smaller carriers: Northwest, hubbed in Minneapolis; Air
Michigan, hubbed in Detroit; and Air Memphis, hubbed in
Memphis. Similarly, the other megacarriers are likely to
split or spin off lesser hubs. Importantly, city-pair compe-
tition improves and the national system avoids domina-
tion by a handful of gargantuan airlines.
Moreover, Air Memphis might eventually find its
growth opportunities saturated on spokes radiating from
Memphis. Such a situation might encourage expansion
into other nonhub markets, thereby restoring some of the
nonstop service that deregulation eradicated. Of course,
for the same reasons that price ceilings are imposed upon
electric, gas, and telephone monopolies, they must also be
imposed upon airline monopolies to prohibit the extrac-
tion of monopoly rents.
B. Pricing
Free market economists predicted that pricing under
deregulation would reflect carrier costs. Rates instead
tend to reflect the level of competition in a given market.
Many markets are so thin that they can only support a sin-
gle carrier. In fact, today, only a single airline serves
nearly two-thirds of America's city-pair markets. Many
are like natural monopolies, for which economic regula-
tion has long been recognized as a legitimate remedy.
The imposition of government regulation prohibits the
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extraction of monopoly or oligopoly rents. An industry-
wide mileage-based formula could be devised as a bench-
mark to assess the reasonableness of rates, and bring
down those rates which cannot be cost justified. Of
course, such a calculation must reflect the lower per mile
cost of relatively short trips.
Congress should impose regulation of rates only in cir-
cumstances in which the airline maintains a sufficient mar-
ket share so that it is in a position to exert market power.
Thus, rate review might only be imposed upon complaint
of consumers, or in city-pair markets in which the offend-
ing airline has more than forty percent of the market (or
an appropriate threshold percentage determined under
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index), and where the rate in
question exceeds an industry measure of fully allocated
costs plus, for example, fifteen percent. The airline
charging the allegedly excessive rate should carry the bur-
den of proof. The parties and the agency reviewing the
rate should be placed under tight time deadlines, and the
agency should be given the power to order refunds of ex-
cess fares collected and to order the rate lowered when
circumstances so require.
The range of rates should include a ceiling and a floor
to prohibit predatory pricing and pricing below fully com-
pensatory levels. Even Kahn recognizes the propensity of
airlines to engage in predatory behavior. According to
Kahn, "the airline industry clearly demonstrates the dan-
gers of permitting unrestricted responses by incumbents
to counter competitive entry, particularly with selective,
pinpointed, or targeted price reductions. 257  Pricing
257 Kahn Interview, supra note 36, at 7. Kahn continued, "The nature of entry is
not independent of the policies of the incumbents .... If you know that if you
enter a market you will immediately be met on the nose or even under the nose,
that will affect your willingness to enter." Id. Kahn has more recently noted that,
"I take perverse satisfaction in having predicted the demise of price-cutting com-
petitors like World and Capitol Airways if we did nothing to limit the predictable
geographically discriminatory response of the incumbent carriers to their entry
.... Kahn, Surprises, supra note 3, at 319.
In fact, the CAB did not heed Kahn's warning. Rather than restricting the com-
petitive response of the incumbents, the Board allowed them to match the intro-
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services below costs to drive a competitor out of the in-
dustry should be circumscribed.
Regulation can protect smaller competitors from the
predatory practices of larger rivals. Judicial antitrust rem-
edies typically only award economic compensation to
those injured by such anticompetitive conduct, and do not
restore the lost competitor to the market. For example,
Sir Freddie Laker, victorious in an out of court settlement
with predatory defendant aircraft manufacturers and com-
peting airlines, did not reenter the transatlantic market in
which he pioneered bargain basement "no frills" ser-
vice. 258  Thus, consumers' interest in a competitive envi-
ronment often remains unvindicated by antitrust
remedies. In contrast, economic regulation can keep the
market flush with small and medium size competitors en-
gaged in a healthy competitive battle, disciplining the
costs and prices of their larger rivals.
The inherent tendency of airlines to engage in destruc-
tive competition (because of the instantly perishable na-
ture of the service sold and the extremely low short-term
marginal costs of production) also provides a legitimate
economic rationale for economic regulation. Within this
"zone of reasonableness" between the aforementioned
price ceiling and floor, market forces should establish the
ductory fares of World and Capitol. As neither airway could sustain the losses,
both exited from not only the transcontinental market, but from scheduled pas-
senger service altogether.
In a recent article, Kahn expounded upon the problem of allowing a competitor
to be driven from the market via predatory means:
As for the increasingly respectable view among economists that pre-
dation is nothing to worry about-why incur the cost of driving a
rival from the market when you're unlikely to be able to sustain mo-
nopoly profits because rivals can always reenter?-my answer then
was and still is: Does anybody really think that new price competitors
will come to the consumer's rescue as promptly as their defunct
predecessors? As I once heard Irwin Stelzer observe, a hiker might
not pay much attention to a "no trespassing" sign standing alone,
but if he sees the field behind it littered with bodies of previous tres-
passers, it's reasonable to suppose he will respect it.
Kahn, Deregulatory Schizophrenia, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1059, 1067 (1987).
2.51 See Dempsey, The International Rate and Route Revolution in North Atlantic Pas-
senger Transportation, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 393 (1978).
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rate charged. Carriers with lower costs or offering lesser
service ought to be able to offer their product to consum-
ers at a relatively lower price.
Price discrimination should also be contained at least
between markets. The Robinson-Patman Act prohibits
price discrimination in the sale of goods. In 1914, when
the legislation was enacted, the public perceived little
need for a prohibition against price discrimination in the
sale of services for the service sector constituted a rela-
tively small segment of the American economy, and regu-
latory agencies circumscribed price discrimination in the
infrastructure industries.
The status of the industry today is quite different. The
regulatory agencies established to prohibit discrimination
no longer perform such a function. Moreover, today's
economy is dominated by the service sector. Thus, it is
time to consider either amending the Robinson-Patman
Act to prohibit discrimination in the sale of services, or re-
establishing the regulatory mechanism for its prohibition.
While carriers should be free to manage yield to fill
seats which otherwise might fly empty by offering a range
of fares to lure customers who might not otherwise fly,
discrimination between markets based on the existence of
competitive alternatives, rather than costs, should be cir-
cumscribed. Today, a passenger flying from Washington
to Cleveland via Detroit pays less than a passenger seated
beside him flying from Washington to Detroit.259 The
first rate regulation provisions ever promulgated by Con-
gress in 1887 included a prohibition against a railroad
charging a customer more for a shorter haul than a longer
haul on the same line in the same direction. Such a provi-
sion would do much to cure the inverse relationship be-
tween price and costs in the airline industry.
2.' See G. BROWN, THE AIRLINE PASSENGER'S GUERILLA HANDBOOK: STRATEGIES
& TACTICS FOR BEATING THE AIR TRAVEL SYSTEM (1989).
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C. Antitrust
Related to Robinson-Patman and other pricing ques-
tions are the myriad of antitrust issues which have arisen
under deregulation. As noted earlier, in the decade fol-
lowing promulgation of the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, fifty-one airline mergers occurred.260 In three and
one-half years, the Department of Transportation ap-
proved each of the twenty-one mergers submitted to it.
Congress should amend the legislation governing air-
line mergers and acquisitions so as to make mergers more
difficult for competing carriers to consummate. Further-
more, statutory criteria for mergers should be tightened
to emphasize antitrust concerns. Of course, prohibitions
against monopoly pricing will do much to ameliorate the
problems created by concentration.
The dominance of incumbents is facilitated not only by
their strangle hold over the "fortress hubs," but also by
the consumer loyalty generated by the free mileage
awarded under frequent flyer programs. Congress should
consider a tax on such benefits to discourage the use of
such programs. As Borenstein notes, the tax-free nature
of the frequent flyer benefit tends to discourage monitor-
ing of the agent (the employee receiving benefits) by the
principal (employer). In effect, businesses pay higher
fares than they otherwise would and are reimbursed by
the taxpayers. 6 1 Congress should also consider the di-
vesture of Computer Reservations Systems (CRS) owned
by airlines because opportunities for anti-competitive
conduct of their owners are, quite simply, excessively
abundant.
D. Small Community Access
Even if perfect competition existed in transportation
(and it does not), society frequently views the achieve-
2 Carroll, Higher Fares, Better Service Are Forecast, USA Today, Oct. 24, 1988, at
2B.
26, HUBS AND HIGH FARES, supra note 86.
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ment of objectives other than allocative efficiency as war-
ranting some sacrifice of the latter. One public policy
objective that may be enhanced by economic regulation is
an equitable geographical distribution of the opportunity
to participate in economic growth. Traditionally, prohibi-
tions against rate discrimination required carriers to price
their services to small communities at or just below cost,
facilitating economic growth in all geographic regions.
Small towns and rural communities are served by fewer
competitors than urban centers, and in the absence of
regulation are more prone to monopolistic exploitation.
Adam Smith recognized that the width and breadth of
the market - the crucial mechanism for extending the di-
vision of labor in his vision - is determined in part by the
price and availability of transportation services.262 Quite
simply, the transportation infrastructure is the foundation
upon which the rest of commerce is built. Without ade-
quate and reasonably priced transportation services, small
towns and rural communities cannot sustain economic
growth. In order to have a healthy economy, all commu-
nities, large and small, must have nondiscriminatory ac-
cess to the transportation infrastructure. If a small town
does not enjoy adequate transportation service at a fair
price, it will be isolated from the mainstream of com-
merce, and wither on the vine.
Transportation firms are the veins and arteries through
which commerce flows. This feature gives the transporta-
tion firms the leverage to facilitate or impede commerce,
and makes their rate and service offerings critically impor-
tant to all who require access to the market for the sale of
their products.
If we are to abandon any notion of entry regulation and
cross-subsidization at the federal level (and perhaps we
should not), then government subsidies for small commu-
nity access should not only be continued, but expanded,
to provide improved airline service. If the pragmatic
262 A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA-
TIONS 19-23 (1985 ed.).
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political realities of budget deficits preclude sufficient
subsidies for air service, then entry and exit regulation
should be reconsidered. Establishing a service territory
for which a carrier is responsible can be an effective mech-
anism for assuring adequate service to small towns and
rural communities.
E. Consumer Protection
Prior to deregulation of the airline industry, the Civil
Aeronautics Board provided comprehensive oversight of
consumer related airline policies. 63 Today, government
regulations govern only two areas of potential abuse:
overbooking and lost or damaged baggage. In all other
areas of consumer liability, the airlines themselves unilat-
erally dictate the rules. Unfortunately, the judiciary has
been less than enthusiastic about picking up the pieces
of the shattered regulatory regime of consumer
protection.2
Deliberate overbooking is a practice which has received
the federal government's seal of approval. Carriers rou-
tinely book reservations for more passengers than they
have seats, assuming some passengers will be "no shows."
When there are more passengers than seats, airlines are
obliged to ask for volunteers, sometimes bribing them
with free flight coupons. If the airline cannot coerce a suf-
ficient number of passengers to surrender their seats vol-
untarily, and thus fails to get passengers with confirmed
reservations to their destinations within an hour of the
schedule, the airline is obliged to fly "bumped" passen-
gers to their destinations as quickly as possible and pay
them a penalty of the one-way ticket price, to a maximum
of $200. If the airline cannot get bumped passengers to
their destinations within two hours, the airline must pay
an additional penalty. To qualify, the passenger must
have checked in on time, have a confirmed reservation, be
"-. Airlines Reluctant to Disclose Rules, Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 1988, at BI, col. 3.
264 See P. DEMPSEY & W. THOMS, supra note 5, at 268-73.
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flying on an aircraft seating sixty or more passengers on a
domestic trip, and be denied boarding due exclusively to
overbooking. 65
It seems highly unfair for the airline to sell a consumer
a nonrefundable ticket when the "confirmed reservation"
turns out not to be confirmed at all. Airlines deliberately
sell more tickets than they have seats, and the "confirmed
reservation" can be yanked away at will, leaving the con-
sumer stranded. If the airlines are concerned about pas-
sengers booking more reservations than they use, let
them insist that passengers guarantee their reservations
with a credit card, as do hotels. Only if the reservation is
guaranteed should the ticket be nonrefundable.
Government regulations place a ceiling on liability for
lost or damaged luggage on domestic flights at $1,250 per
person. Treaties limit liability on international flights to
$20 per kilogram.26 6 All other liability rules of airlines are
required to be set forth in their unilateral "Conditions of
Contract of Carriage." Many of these rules are patently
unfair to consumers.
For example, while some airlines allow passengers up
to forty-five days to file a complaint regarding lost or
damaged luggage, others require that passengers file
within only a few hours after landing. 6 7 Airlines can can-
cel reservations for any passenger who fails to check in
within ten minutes of takeoff.2 6
With hub-and-spoke systems becoming the dominant
means of air transport, many consumers find that delays
may cause them to miss their hub connections. Even
when the delay is the fault of the airline, as in the event of
a mechanical breakdown or a late crew, several carriers
deny liability for any additional meals or hotel bills the
passenger may incur as a result of the missed connection.
24,5 Airline v. Consumer: Your Rights, CONSUMER REPORTS TRAVEL LETrER, Apr.
1989, at 40 [hereinafter Airline v. Consumer].
26 Id.
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If the delay is the airline's fault, most will arrange alterna-
tive transportation to the passenger's destination. Most
will not do so if the delay is due to weather or air traffic. 69
Several other areas exist where governmental oversight
would be prudent. For example, penalties for market-in-
spired flight cancellations should be increased and made
mandatory. Carrier liability for missed connections re-
sulting from flight delays should be imposed. Travel
agent commission overrides, which provide an incentive
for consumer fraud, should be outlawed. Width across
seats and distance between them should be designated so
that an average-sized person can enjoy a comfortable
flight on a long trip without having his knees jammed
against the seat in front of him. The market seems capa-
ble only of providing sardine-can travel.
Moreover, the government must intervene to protect
consumers against false and misleading advertising. "Bait
and switch" is a pervasive problem. An airline advertises,
for example, a $199 fare to Orlando; when the consumer
calls she is informed that those seats are sold, but there is
a bargain immediate-purchase, nonrefundable, Saturday-
stay-over seat available for $479. The $199 fare might
have been available for only a very few seats, yet the fine
print often fails to explain the restrictions adequately.
Consumer protection demands sensible advertising
regulation. Tighter airline advertising regulation has
been endorsed by the Attorneys General of more than
forty states.2 70 Ample jurisdiction exists under of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act 27 1 to protect the public against unfair
and deceptive competitive practices, if only the Depart-
ment of Transportation would exercise it.
F. Safety
An important public policy objective which can be pro-
'611 Airline v. Consumer, supra note 265, at 40-4 1.
2 0 Tightening of Ad Rules for Airlines Supported, Rocky Mountain News, Dec. 15,
1987, at 13B.
7 1' 49 U.S.C. § 411 (1982).
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moted by regulation is enhanced margins of safety. Regu-
lation is superior to judicially-ordained tort damage
awards for injuries, in that however well money can ease
the pain of injury, economic compensation for injury fre-
quently cannot restore health, and can never restore life.
In contrast, regulation attempts to prevent injuries before
they occur, thereby protecting the innocent from harm.
In order to deal with the problems of safety which have
arisen under deregulation, certain things must be done.
The air traffic control system should be refurbished. The
Federal Aviation Administration needs to restaff the traffic
control system beyond the pre-PATCO strike levels of
1981 and FAA equipment needs to be updated and
upgraded.
Congress should devote sufficient resources to building
new airports and expanding existing ones. No new major
airport has been built in the United States since 1974,
when Dallas/Ft. Worth International Airport was con-
structed. Since then, national air traffic has doubled and
will double again by the end of the century. Despite this
exponential growth in traffic, only two new major airports
are being planned. One is in Denver; the other, in Austin.
Local opposition to noise, congestion, and pollution ex-
ists to hinder new airport expansion and development.
Perhaps it is time to consider federal legislation pre-empt-
ing local opposition to regional airport construction.2 72
Congestion at hub airports can be reduced by regulat-
ing landings and takeoffs and by imposing peak period
landing fees. 2 " This will help flatten out usage some-
what, and reduce congestion. Landing fees should also
reflect the opportunity costs of delay, which would sug-
gest that a higher landing fee should be imposed upon
small aircraft, and a smaller fee imposed upon larger air-
272 Of course, compensation for legitimate loss of property values should be
paid.
27s To the extent that landing fees do not reflect full social costs, the efficiency
of hub and spoking may be partly illusory because hub and spoking utilizes, inten-
sively, peak period airport facilities, and the private cost of this resource lies below
its social cost due to subsidization.
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craft, thereby favoring the larger number of human users
of finite public resources.
Enhanced safety requires that more attention be paid to
the economic health of firms, for deferred maintenance
seems to be associated with economic anemia. Not only
are economically unhealthy carriers suspect, but those
purchased by corporate raiders are also of concern. For
example, the Consumer Federation of America has ac-
cused Carl Icahn of using TWA's profits to finance his
raids on other firms rather than ploughing back profits
into badly needed new aircraft. 74 Frank Lorenzo also
stripped Eastern of essential assets.2 7
Hence, the regulation of carrier fitness in licensing
should be taken more seriously by the Department of
Transportation. The Federal Aviation Administration
should keep a keener eye on aircraft and pilot qualifica-
tions. If that proves inadequate to increase the margin of
safety over the long term, then more comprehensive regu-
lation which enhances the economic health of the industry
may be required. Safety can never be decoupled from
economic health.
G. A New Independent Federal Transportation Commission
Much of what is wrong with deregulation is the fault of
the implementing agencies due to their zeal in embracing
laissez-faire ideology. The statutes which ordained deregu-
lation called for gradual entry and pricing liberalization,
yet their interpretation by the regulatory agencies has
bordered on irresponsible. Much of that is attributable
to White House dominance and the executive's strong
ideological agenda. Because White House domination of
the DOT should have easily been foreseen, Congress was
asking for trouble when it transferred the remaining regu-
214 Answer of the Consumer Federation of America to the Petition of the Inter-
national Federation of Flight Attendants, DOT Docket No. 45792. In March,
1989, TWA finally placed an order for several Airbus Industry aircraft.
275 Dempsey, Corporate Pirates Assault the Heavens-Leveraged Buy-Outs and the Air-
line Industry, 2 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 79-86 (1989).
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latory responsibilities of the CAB during its "sunset" to
the DOT.276
Many critics allege that after the initial euphoria of pub-
lic interest protection wears off in the first decade or two
of their existence, regulatory commissions tend to favor
the interests of the industry they regulate. This result is a
natural phenomenon: while other groups may come and
go, the well-financed regulated industry is the one constit-
uency consistently before the agency pleading its case and
seeking relief.
A related problem follows from the fact that former
Commissioners are often recruited by the industry to
serve as executive officers. Ironically, this phenomenon
appears under deregulation as well. For example, Alfred
Kahn, Mike Levine and Phil Bakes of the deregulationist
CAB and Elliot Seiden of the Reagan Justice Depart-
ment's Antitrust Division subsequently joined Frank Lo-
renzo's Texas Air empire.
In the final analysis, there are important regulatory
functions to be performed by government, and we have to
create a mechanism to perform them without undue polit-
ical and ideological bias. In order to avoid the capture
problem, the regulatory functions pertaining to all trans-
portation should be swept into a new Federal Transportation
Commission. Those functions formerly carried out by the
CAB and now the DOT for airlines, by the ICC for rail
and motor carriers, by the Federal Maritime Commission
for ocean carriers, and by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission for pipelines could be carried out by an in-
dependent federal agency outside the executive branch.
An agency with jurisdictions over airlines, motor carriers,
bus companies, pipelines, railroads, and domestic and in-
ternational water carriers would be difficult to capture by
any single firm or transport mode.
To enhance its independence, the new Federal Trans-
276 P. DEMPSEY, LAW & FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 12, at 234-39 (discussing
problems involving executive branch control).
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portation Commission should be comprised of at least
seven members appointed by the President, with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate, to serve staggered, six
year terms. They should be selected from a list of candi-
dates prepared by a blue ribbon panel of industry, labor,
and consumer members appointed by Senate and the
President, thereby enhancing the Constitutional mandate
of legislative advice and consent. By calling upon an in-
dependent body to recommend potential candidates for
nomination, we can reduce the propensity of some Presi-
dents to fill Commissions with political cronies.
The skills and competence of the men and women who
serve will, in the final analysis, determine how well
broader social needs are fulfilled. Potential Commission-
ers should be selected on the basis of their competence,
skill and neutrality on the issues they will confront. They
must have a deep and abiding respect for the law and the
supremacy of the legislative branch in defining the param-
eters within which they shall administer the regulatory
function. It is not just the substantive law, which defines
the agency's jurisdictional limits, to which there must be
fidelity, but also the procedural and evidentiary require-
ments of due process, for the agency will inevitably be
quasi-judicial in nature. It must be filled with individuals
who possess judicial temperament. As Joseph Eastman,
Franklin Roosevelt's Transportation Coordinator, said:
"The important qualifications [of a Commissioner] are
ability to grasp and comprehend facts quickly, and to con-
sider them in their relation to the law logically and with an
open mind. Zealots, evangelists, and crusaders have their
value before an administration tribunal, but not on it." 277
Legislation must necessarily be drawn broadly. Statutes
cannot be drafted with perfect precision because of both
problems of practical politics and the limitations of the
English language. Additionally, some flexibility is desira-
277 Remarks by Honorable Joseph B. Eastman, Silver Anniversay Celebration
Held in His Honor (Feb. 17, 1944), reprinted in Eastman, Twelve Point Primer, 16
TRANSP. L.J. 175, 177 (1987).
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ble to enable the Commission to address new challenges
as they arise. Nevertheless, Congress should make more
of an effort to tighten the agency's discretion and identify
more precisely its jurisdictional parameters. Congres-
sional committees should perform more rigorous over-
sight hearings more often, raking appointed officials over
the coals when they stray beyond Congressional intent.
The judiciary should also look closely at the orders and
rules emanating from regulatory agencies and strike down
more on grounds that they are ultra vires.17 ' Legislative
and judicial checks and balances should be employed to
pull the agency to the center, away from the extremes of
either heavy-handed regulation, or rampant deregulation.
In order to avoid political bias, no more than a simple
majority of commissioners should be members of a single
political party. In order to alleviate the likelihood of
White House domination of the agency's affairs, the Com-
mission should be free to elect its own Chairman. In or-
der to avoid pro-industry bias, strict restrictions should be
placed on the ability of Commission members to work for
the regulated industry when they leave the Commission.
Improved process will vastly improve the regulatory
function. In fact, had a neutral and responsible regula-
tory agency without a strong ideological agenda imple-
mented deregulation during the past decade, it is quite
likely that the results would have been significantly less
onerous.
A suggestion that there is an appropriate role for a reg-
ulatory agency should not be construed to mean that we
need to return to the rigid regulatory regime of the late
1960s and early 1970s. The period of modest regulatory
reform of 1976-78 proved that both the industry and the
public it serves can benefit significantly from enlightened
regulation. Allowing carriers modest pricing flexibility so
they could tap the elasticities of demand and fill capacity
278 An act is ultra vires if its enaction is beyond the scope of the power of the
enacting body.
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proved to be a win-win situation for both the airlines and
consumers.
Moreover, not even the most omniscient regulatory
commission can make all the decisions concerning levels
of production and pricing. We leave that to individual,
privately-owned firms, with regulatory bodies identifying
the broad parameters within which the firms may lawfully
operate. Regulation at the margins, while allowing pri-
vately owned firms to satiate consumer demands, is all
that is required. Government should set the parameters,
not the particulars, of lawful behavior.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
During the 1980s, deregulation swept not only through
transportation, 279 but also through the other infrastruc-
ture industries. Telecommunications, broadcasting, cable
television, banking, oil and gas, securities, and to a lesser
extent, electric utilities all were released from the grip of
rigid regulation. But the high-water mark of deregulation
as a blossoming political movement seems to be behind
us, having peaked late in the Carter and early in the Rea-
gan Administrations. The flower has lost its bloom. As
the American people have had more experience with the
grand experiment in deregulation, they have become less
enamored of it.
Recently, the Wall Street Journal asked Americans to
identify the industries in which they had most, or least,
2- Legislation deregulating transportation was not confined to aviation. The
federal statutes partially deregulating various aspects of the transportation indus-
try include the following:
The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976
The Air Cargo Act of 1977
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
The International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979.
The Motor Carrier Act of 1980
The Staggers Rail Act of 1980
The Household Goods Transportation Act of 1980
The Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982
The Shipping Act of 1984
The Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984
The Freight Forwarder Deregulation Act of 1986.
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confidence.2 10 The largest number by far, forty-three per-
cent, said they had the least confidence in the airline in-
dustry. 281' The disapproval ratings for the industries that
followed - insurance (twenty-seven percent), banking
(twenty-three percent), oil and gas (twenty-two percent),
and stockbrokers (twenty-two percent) - were not nearly
as high as that for airlines.282 Congress has not passed a
major deregulation bill in recent years, and is considering
various reregulation proposals for a number of industries
too hastily deregulated. Targeted industries include
banking, securities, and those transport modes which
have experienced the most comprehensive deregulation
- railroads and airlines.
The experience with airline deregulation - the stark
juxtaposition between what was promised and what was
delivered - ought to make future deregulators pause.
Neither traditionalist predictions of many competing car-
riers nor nontraditionalist predictions of a few competi-
tors constrained by the threat of entry to conduct
themselves like the textbook perfect competitors, have
been borne out.
In the early years of deregulation, new low cost airlines
emerged to rival the established carriers. But where have
all the flowers gone? Where are the Donald Burrs and Sir
Freddie Lakers today, with their discount prices and spar-
tan service? The spartan service survived, but the new en-
trepreneurs have fled a ruthlessly predatory economic
environment, never to return, and taken their discounts
with them. We are left with an oligopoly of megacarriers
and, in many regional and city-pair markets, a shared mo-
nopoly. With the creation of frequent flyer programs,
travel agent commission overrides, and megacarrier dom-
inance of fortress hubs and computer reservations sys-
28O Schwadel, Consumer Trust: An Elusive Quarry, Wall St.J., Sept. 20, 1989, at BI,
col.3.
"' Id.; see also Winans & Dahl, Airlines Skid on Bad Moves, Bad News, Wall St. 3.,
Sept. 20, 1989, at BI, col. 3.
282 Schwadel, supra note 280, at B I, Col. 3.
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tems, new entry is today highly unlikely. Moreover, the
threat of new entry has proven to be a toothless deterrent
to the unrestrained exercise of market power. The pre-
dictable result is that prices are now above where they
would have been had the prederegulation downward
trend continued. s3 The early gains in the form of lower
fares were completely dissipated by 1988.
The market for air transport services is not perfectly
competitive as significant economies of scale, scope, and
density exist. Nor is it contestable. Economic barriers to
new entry are formidable. Oligopolies and monopolies
with effective market power have resulted.
Another result of deregulation is that the industry is
saddling itself with enormous debt and excess fleet capac-
ity. During the first decade of deregulation, the industry
was so terribly anemic that few airlines could afford to
reequip with new equipment, despite the aging of their
fleets. Staring bankruptcy in the face, many found merg-
ers a means of enhancing size and scope, and thereby
profitability. The creation of fortress hubs also gave air-
lines market power - the power to raise ticket prices.
Now that airlines are becoming money machines, they
have become targets for leveraged buy-outs (LBOs).
Alfred Checchi recently purchased Northwest for $4 bil-
lion. United, Delta and USAir may also be targets.
Prior LBOs reveal that corporate raiders leverage air-
lines to the teeth to pay for their acquisitions. Frank
Lorenzo gobbled up Continental and Eastern. Corporate
raider Carl Icahn grabbed TWA and Ozark. Both added
millions in indebtedness to these once financially secure
airlines, and stripped them of assets. Before Eastern fell
into bankruptcy, it carried $2.5 billion on long-term debt;
its debt service was a crushing $575 million. TWA carries
281 Some analysts estimate 2.6 percent higher in 1989, per mile, and perhaps as
much as 36 percent greater per trip, given the greater circuitry for which deregu-
lation is responsible, and the differential is projected to grow in coming years.
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$2.5 billion in debt 28 4 and lease obligations, and has a
negative net worth of $30 million.28 5
Not only are LBOs burying airlines in debt, new aircraft
acquisitions are as well. Media attention directed at geri-
atric jets - the peeling skin and the exploding doors -
has prompted airlines to order huge new fleets of aircraft.
Earlier this year, United placed a record $38 billion order
for new aircraft. American has 259 aircraft on order and
302 or option. Delta has options or orders for 215 jets,
including forty giant MD- 1s . Texas Air placed an order
for 100 jets - fifty firm and fifty on option. Northwest
has placed $8.4 billion in orders and options for 140 jets.
Even miserly Carl Icahn, whose TWA has the oldest fleet
in the industry, placed an order for a few Airbuses. The
industry as a whole has placed orders or options for $150
billion in new aircraft.
Adding new jets will mercifully reduce the age of the
nation's fleet. That will be a welcome blessing for the
margin of safety, but it saddles the industry with even
more debt.
Moreover, unlike the days before deregulation when
airlines actually owned most of their aircraft, today they
lease them. For example, American Airlines owns only
about a third of its 476 aircraft outright. Even solid carri-
ers like Delta have sold large numbers of aircraft only to
lease them back. This practice increases debt, but de-
creases value.
Lease obligations usually do not show up on balance
sheets as debt, but like accumulated frequent flyer mile-
age, they should. Including lease obligations as debt
reveals that the industry's debt to equity ratio today is sig-
nificantly worse than it was in the mid-1980s, although the
industry's performance has improved considerably since
then. Whether purchased outright or leased, new aircraft
2" Vogel, Carl Icahn Has Lots of Cash. Will He Spend It on TWA?, Bus. WK.,July 17,
1989, at 86, 87.
2K.1 Power, Raiders May Not Make the Best Airline Pilots, Bus. Wi., May 15, 1989, at
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not only impose tremendous debt, but they also flood the
market with capacity.
The wild cards - fuel prices, aerial terrorism, and re-
cession - must also be considered. Rising fuel prices in-
creased industry costs in the 1970s and 1980s. Upsurges
in terrorism and downturns in the economy each curtail
demand. Considering the poor financial condition of
most airlines today, a recession could have especially dev-
astating effects.
Few industries are as susceptible to downward turns in
the economy as are airlines. Recessions prompt travelers
to cancel their vacations, and force business travelers to
tighten their belts. As a result, passenger demand
plummets.
Unfilled seats on a scheduled flight are in the nature of
an instantly perishable commodity; short term marginal
costs - another meal and a few more drops of fuel - are
negligible. Accordingly, during slack demand periods,
ticket prices spiral downward.
Couple a prolonged recession with excess capacity and
high debt service and another round of bankruptcies and
mergers similar to the one endured in the early 1980s will
likely result. When the dust settles, the industry will be
even more concentrated than it is now. Fewer and larger
megacarriers will dominate the national landscape, and
increased prices will result.
The time has come to take a fresh look at the mess that
deregulation has made, and devise an enlightened re-
sponse. Nevertheless, the debate over what should be
done with an infrastructure industry so important to the
nation has been falsely cast in terms of only two options
- heavy-handed regulation and deregulation. Neither
are desirable alternatives.
The public debate must begin to move beyond these
polar extremes and explore more moderate alternatives.
Neither governmental control nor unregulated competi-
tion are perfect environments. The real choice is between im-
perfect regulation and imperfect competition. But if applied with
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a gentle touch, economic regulation ought to be able to
yield the best of both worlds - the economies and effi-
ciencies of private ownership, and the accomplishment of
social and economic policies in the highest public interest.
Transportation, generally, and air transport, in particular,
have too vast a social and economic impact in communica-
tion and commerce to be left to the whims of a dwindling
club of unconstrained monopolists. Transportation is
one industry in which the public interest must again be
dominant. We ought to have the courage and wisdom to
admit we made a mistake. The time has come to roll back
deregulation.
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APPENDIX
Data, Methods and a Note on Morrison and Winston's
"Counterfactual" Analysis of the Effects of Airline Deregulation
on Fares 286
Annual data on nominal yields (revenue per passenger
mile) came from the Air Transport Association. The an-
nual average value of the Consumer Price Index (All
Items) was used as a deflator to construct an index of real
yields. Annual average fuel costs and the share of fuel in
all expenses came from the Air Transport Association's
Airline Cost Index for the years from 1970 on. For the
earlier years included in the analysis (1967-69), both fuel
costs and the fuel share of expenses were estimated, as
noted below, as these data were generally unavailable.
Real fuel costs were constructed using the CPI as a
deflator.
The fuel-adjusted real yield was constructed as follows.
Starting from an arbitrary level at the beginning of the
period, the percentage change in the index in each year is
computed as the difference between the percentage
change in the unadjusted real yield, on the one hand, and
the product of the percentage change in real fuel prices
and the fuel share of costs in the previous year (and thus
at the beginning of the current year), on the other. For
example, if for some year some yields rose ten percent,
real fuel costs twenty percent and fuel costs in the prior
year were twenty percent of costs, then the calculation of
the percentage change in fuel-adjusted real yields would
be: 10-.2(20)=6 percent. The reported trend differences
before and after deregulation were obtained by regressing
the natural logarithm of unadjusted and fuel-adjusted real
yields, in turn, on time (with 1967=0), a time/deregula-
tion dummy to capture any change in trend post-deregu-
lation, and a deregulation dummy to capture any one-time
'' S. MORRISON & C. WINSTON, supra note 139, at 22.
AIRLINE DEREGULATION
shift after deregulation. The first two columns of the ta-
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in parentheses)
* DTime takes on the value of time in
prior years.
1978 and after, and 0 for
** DInt takes on the value of unity in 1978 and after, and 0 for
prior years.
The coefficient on time gives the estimated trend rate of
increase in real yields prior to 1978. The sum of the coef-
ficients on time and DTime gives the estimated trend rate
of increase in real yields after 1978. Thus a statistically
significant coefficient on DTime indicates a statistically
significant difference in and trend before the after deregula-
tion. In column one, with the unadjusted real yield as the
dependent variable, the trend rate of increase is signifi-
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cantly lower (a bigger rate of decay) after as compared
with before deregulation. As column 2 shows, however,
the fuel-adjusted real yield grew significantly faster (a
slower decay rate) after as deregulation. The estimated
one-time percentage shift in real yields for which deregu-
lation is responsible can be computed as the antilo-
garithm of the difference between the absolute value of
the coefficient in DInt, on the one hand, and the product
of 11 (the value of Time in 1978) and the coefficient of
DTime, on the other. For the fuel-adjusted real yield, this
computation yields 12.8 percent as the one-time decline
in yield due to deregulation.
Fuel costs for the years 1967-69 were predicted by ker-
osene prices based on the regression of fuel coasts on ker-
osene prices (obtained from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Producer Price Index) in those years (1970 and
after) when both variables were available. The estimate of
the fuel share of expenses in 1967-69 was based on the
regression of fuel share on the natural logarithm of real
fuel costs for 1970 and after. Finally, in computing the
estimated real yield in 1989, only year-to-date data on the
yield for domestic services alone was available (from the
Air Transport Association). The estimate for the yield on
all services was made using the predicted value based on
the regression of the yield for all services on the yield for
domestic service alone in the years (1978 and after) when
both were available. In each case the variables used to
make the estimate were highly correlated with the variable
to be estimated (R2 in the regression of fuel costs on ker-
osene prices was .998; for the regression of fuel share of
expenses on real fuel costs, R' was .960; and for the re-
gression of the yield on all service on the domestic yield
only, R2 was .989).
The third column of Table A-I reports the results of a
regression which would appear to throw some doubt on
the methodology employed by Morrison and Winston in
their study of the effects of airline deregulation, in which
they claim that deregulation was responsible for "an over-
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all reduction in fares of nearly 30 percent. ' 2 7 This esti-
mate is based on a "counter-factual" methodology in
which they ask what fares would have been in 1977 if de-
regulation had been in effect then, and compare the result
to actual fares in 1977. The estimate of what fares would
have been in 1977 under deregulation is based on the re-
lationship between input costs - chiefly fuel and labor -
and revenues-per-passenger in the period 1980-82 for
major carriers. The regression of fares on input costs for
this period allows them to predict 1977 deregulated fares
based on 1977 input costs.
This method is highly problematic once the secular
downward trend in real yields - even holding input costs
constant - is appreciated. The third column of Table A-
1 illustrates this trend. Even holding real labor and fuel
costs constant, real yields fell by 3.5 percent per year, in-
dicating a secular increase in productivity in the industry
which prevailed prior to deregulation and if anything has
been adversely affected by deregulation (the coefficient on
DTime is positive, but not statistically significant).
Given such a secular trend, a substantial part of the dif-
ference between Morrison and Winston's "1977 Deregu-
lated Yield" and the actual yield simply reflects the
passage of time and the correlated productivity improve-
ments between 1977 and 1981-82, when Morrison and
Winston estimated their fare-cost relationship. This trend
has nothing to do with deregulation and if anything was
slowed down by deregulation. Half of the effect they find
(fourteen of twenty-eight percent - they round the latter
to 30) might well be spurious for this reason.
Second, if disaggregated data were to confirm the lower
rate of productivity improvement (lower rate of price de-
cline, holding costs constant) after deregulation which is
weakly supported in the aggregate annual data used for
the regression reported above, then Morrison and Win-
ston would only be telling us about a one-time shift which
281 Morrison & Winston, Airline Deregulation and Public Policy, SCIENCE, Aug. 18,
1989, at 707-708.
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could eventually be dissipated. In fact, coincidentally, the
fourteen percent shift that their results, properly inter-
preted, can attribute to deregulation is almost identical to
the one-time shift (12.8 percent) that our descriptive
trend analysis finds in the data. Thus, our conclusions
that consumers paid in 1988 what they would have paid
without deregulation, and actually pay 2.6 percent more
in 1989 - these conclusions are not inconsistent with
Morrison and Winston's finding of a 30 percent fare reduc-
tion using their faulty methodology. It behooves them to
use a method which allows for the trend decline in fares
holding costs constant that the industry, deregulated or
not, has historically exhibited before their *estimates of
"gains" to consumers in the form of lower fares can be
taken seriously.
